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NOTE
MUDDYING THE WATERS: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
MERCK V. INTEGRA FAILS TO RESOLVE
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. §
271 (E)(1), THE "SAFE HARBOR"




The constitutional purpose of the patent system is to promote the
progress of the useful arts by granting the inventor the exclusive right
to his invention for a limited time.' The patent system is utilitarian in
nature, premised on the assumption that, but for the prospect of a right
to exclude others from making, using, importing, or selling the inven-
tion granted by a patent, there will be inadequate incentives to invent
t Associate, Global Patent Group, LLC.; J.D. expected 2007, cum laude,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.S. 2004, University
of California, San Diego. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author and should not be attributed to Global Patent
Group, LLC, or present or former clients.
I U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to enact legisla-
tion for this purpose). The exclusive right of the inventor to his invention is defined
by the patentee's cause of action for infringement under the patent statute. A third
party infringes a patent whOen they use, sell, offer to sell, or import the patented
invention into the United States without the authorization of the patentee. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154(a)(1) 271, 281, (2000). The patentee has two basic remedies for infringement:
injunctive relief and monetary damages. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (granting courts with
jurisdiction over patent cases the authority to issue injunctions to prevent the violation
of any fight secured by the patent); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (granting the right to
recover damages up to three times the amount of a "reasonable royalty").
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and commercialize new technologies and, as a result, such technolo-
gies will be produced sub-optimally.2
Any intellectual property regime that grants exclusive rights has
the potential to frustrate its underlying utilitarian purpose by prevent-
ing third parties from using the protected subject matter in socially
beneficial ways. Such collateral effects may be mitigated by limiting
the scope of protectable subject matter or by limiting the right to ex-
clude. Patent law has relatively few such limits. For example, the
scope of patentable subject matter is very broad: any process, ma-
chine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof
may be patented so long as it is useful.3
As the scope of patentable subject matter is broad, so the scope of
excused infringement is narrow. Presently, only three classes of patent
infringement are exempted from liability: experimentation under the
common law doctrine of experimental use,4 medical procedures, 5 and
2 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 50 (3d ed. 2004).
The incentive to invent theory of patent law postulates that too few inventions will be
made in the absence of patent protection because, once made, inventions will be eas-
ily appropriated by competitors of the original inventor, who will not be able to earn a
sufficient return on the costs of research and development unless ensured an exclusive
right to the invention. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024-29 (1989).
The incentive to commercialize or prospect theory of patent law holds that the exclu-
sive patent right is necessary to induce and facilitate parties to take the risks of manu-
facturing, advertising, distributing, and selling a commercial product that embodies
the invention. Id. at 1036-44. Without this activity, the invention would not be deliv-
ered to the public. Furthermore, by fixing the property rights in new technologies,
parties will be able to bargain towards an efficient result in which the firm that is best
able to bring the product embodying the invention to market will do so. Id.
3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The Supreme Court has stated that this "include[s]
anything under the sun that is made by man" and excludes only "laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980) (citing S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
4 The common law doctrine of experimental use was originally set forth by
Joseph Story, who stated "it could have never been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed [a patented] machine merely for philosophical ex-
periments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to pro-
duce its described effects." Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F.Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813). The viability of the experimental use doctrine as a defense to patent
infringement has been severely limited by a series of Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (2003);
Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating experimen-
tal use does not require an intent inquiry and, therefore, upholding the experimental
use doctrine); Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed: Cir. 1984). While the
Federal Circuit has never explicitly stated that the experimental use exemption no
longer exists, it has consistently applied a narrow "legitimate business" test, adopting
Court of Claims precedent stating that "tests, demonstrations, and experiments [that]
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certain activities associated with the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulatory process, which are exempted under the "safe har-
bor" provision of The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Resto-
ration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.6
are in keeping with the legitimate business of the [alleged infringer]" are infringe-
ments for which "experimental use is not a defense." Pitcaim v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In the most controversial of the Federal Circuit's
experimental use decisions, the court found that Duke University, a non-profit re-
search institution, was not excused from infringement liability for its use of patented
lasers to conduct basic research on nuclear physics because such research was part of
the "legitimate business" of the university. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. The Federal
Circuit's narrowing of the experimental use exemption in Madey and Merck has elic-
ited a great deal of commentary, including calls for a statutory experimental use ex-
emption. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from
United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Non-
profit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 973 (2004) (proposing a
statutory experimental use defense that would excuse the infringing experimental
activity upon consideration of the following factors:
(1) the availability of consensual licenses; (2) whether the challenged use
amounts to experimenting on a claimed invention rather than experimenting
with it; (3) the degree to which the alleged experimental activity is neces-
sarily incident to subsequent commercial exploitation; and (4) the balance
of harms invoked in the granting or denial of an experimental use defense
under the particular facts at hand).
See also Eisenberg, supra note 2, 1074 (arguing that "the case of an experimental use
exemption is strongest when the subsequent researcher is using a patented invention
to check the validity of the patent holder's claims"); Donna M. Gitter, International
Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1678-90 (2001) (proposing a combination of compulsory li-
censing scheme and a statutory experimental use exemption as a solution to problems
relating to the patenting of human DNA sequences); Katherine J. Strandburg, What
Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
81, 118-22 (2004) (arguing that a solution to the problem of enabling experimental
use that fosters innovation while protecting patent incentives can be furthered by a
legal standard that differentiates between experimenting on non-self-disclosing inven-
tions and experimenting with a patented invention).
' 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000) (exempting medical practitioners and related
entities such as hospitals from infringement liability arising from the performance of
patented medical or surgical procedures). This exemption is quite narrow because it
does not include "(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition
of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a
biotechnology patent" - i.e., medical devices, drugs, and biotechnology processes. 35
U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (2000).
6 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (2000); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 355, 360cc (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp.
2003); 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 282 (2000)). The "safe harbor" provision is contained in 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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The relevant text of the "safe harbor" provision, codified in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably re-
lated to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.7
Although 271(e)(1) was originally enacted to shield activities
related to FDA regulatory approval of generic drugs through the Ab-
breviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process, the scope of the
exemption as interpreted by the courts has gradually expanded over
the two decades since its enactment to include activities related to a
number of regulatory applications other than ANDAs and to FDA
approval of non-drug products.8 What was once a limited and narrow
exemption has grown quite broad and now threatens to deprive hold-
ers of early-stage pharmaceutical 9 and research tool l° patents of the
7 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
8 See infra Parts II-III.
9 For the purpose of this Note, an "early-stage pharmaceutical invention" is
an invention that is embodied by a drug product that has yet to be fully developed and
for which FDA approval has not yet been sought. The terms early-stage pharmaceuti-
cal invention and research tools are necessarily imprecise and occasionally overlap.
10 The National Institutes of Health has defined research tools as "the full
range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory" and recognizes that from the
perspective of a party who markets or licenses such research tools they "may be
viewed as 'end products."' REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH)
WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/research
tools/#background [hereinafter NIH Report]. Research tools include "cell lines,
monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chem-
istry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), meth-
ods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and computer software." Id. For
alternative definitions of research tools, see also Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (defining a re-
search tool as a product or method whose purpose is use in the context of research);
Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Excep-
tion to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 45-
48 (2001) (restricting an analysis of "research tools" to patented tools used in the
development of new pharmaceutical products that do not themselves incorporate the
tool and to which access is restricted). Research tool patents have spawned a substan-
tial body of recent literature, with some commentators expressing concern that exces-
sive research tool patenting may inhibit biomedical research. See, e.g., Natalie M.
Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising From Patenting
Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347,
392-402 (2003) (expressing concern about reach-through royalty licensing of research
380 HEALTH MATRIX (Vol. 17:377
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right to exclude others from the most commercially significant uses of
their patented inventions. This loss of meaningful patent protection,
which was not adequately considered by Congress at the time the
Hatch-Waxman Act was passed, threatens to dis-incentivize the in-
vention and commercialization of early stage pharmaceutical and re-
search tool inventions.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Merck v. Integra,' which
expanded the scope of the 271(e)(1) infringement exemption to
include preclinical drug discovery research, further threatens the
incentives to invent and commercialize early stage pharmaceutical and
research tool inventions provided by the patent laws. This Note exam-
ines the present scope of the 271(e)(1) infringement exemption as it
relates to preclinical pharmaceutical research in the aftermath of
Merck and argues that, in order to protect the incentives to invent and
commercialize early stage pharmaceutical and research tool inven-
tions, courts should interpret 271(e)(1) narrowly. That is, the only
exemptions from infringement should be ANDA-related bioequiva-
lence testing, experimentation on pioneer drugs for the purpose of
facilitating disclosure beyond that required for patentability, the use of
pioneer drugs as positive controls, and comparative testing of pioneer
drugs to assess the regulatory and market position of a new drug
candidate.
Part I of this Note reviews the circumstances that gave rise to the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 271(e)(1). In Part II, the
history of judicial interpretation of 271(e)(1) prior to Merck is briefly
reviewed. Part III discusses the Merck case and the present scope of
271(e)(1) as applied to preclinical and clinical pharmaceutical
research. Part IV examines representative cases where drug develop-
ment companies may seek to infringe the patents of others and
assesses whether such infringing activities can be justified by broader
patent policies. Part V of this Note examines the likely consequences
of the Merck holding in cases where a pharmaceutical firm chooses to
tools); see Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools,
and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 141, 141 (2004) (drawing a line between commercial applications and re-
search tools). But see David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech
Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005) (arguing that biotechnology pat-
enting does not present a significant threat to further innovation because of the fun-
damentally open-ended nature of the life sciences). See Peter Lee, Note, Patents,
Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 663 (2004)
(arguing that strong patent protection for research tools encourages groundbreaking
scientific discoveries by forcing basic science researchers to look beyond existing
technologies).
" 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
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engage in unlicensed clinical development of a drug that is claimed by
another firm's patent. Finally, Part VI of this Note suggests an
amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) that would narrow the scope of
the infringement exemption.
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which contained the infringement ex-
emption eventually codified in 271(e)(1), was enacted in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche v. Bolar.'
2
Roche, a pharmaceutical company, held the patent to flurazepam hy-
drochloride, the active ingredient in its FDA approved name brand
sleeping pill Dalmane.13 Bolar, a generic drug manufacturer, became
interested in marketing a generic equivalent to Dalmane.14 In order to
obtain FDA approval for its generic equivalent, Bolar needed to file a
New Drug Application (NDA), supported by stability and pharma-
cokinetic15 studies showing that its generic product was biologically
equivalent to Dalmane.16 Because such testing and subsequent evalua-
tion frequently took up to two years, Bolar imported five kilograms of
flurazepam hydrochloride in order to commence bioequivalence test-
ing six months before Roche's patent was due to expire.' 7 Roche sub-
sequently filed a complaint against Bolar for patent infringement and
sought to enjoin Bolar from performing its planned bioequivalence
testing.1 8 The district court denied the injunction, stating that Bolar's
testing was not an infringement of the Roche patent because the use
was de minimis and experimental. 19
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Federal Cir-
cuit first noted that, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), any use of a patented
invention constitutes infringement, regardless of whether the patentee
has evidence of damages or lost sales.20 As for Bolar's experimental
use defense, the Federal Circuit noted that, under Court of Claims
precedent that is binding on the Federal Circuit, "'[tiests, demonstra-
tions, and experiments ... [which] are in keeping with the legitimate
12 Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
"3 Id. at 860.
14 id.
15 Pharmacokinetics is the study of how substances behave in the body over
time. Typically, the pharmacokinetic properties of a given substance are determined
by the rate at which it is absorbed, distributed, metabolized, and excreted by the body.
16 Roche, 733 F.2d at 860.
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 860-61.
20 Id. at 861.
[Vol. 17:377
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business of the . . . [alleged infringer]' are infringements for which
'[e]xperimental use is not a defense. ' ' 21 Since Bolar's use of the
patented compound was in pursuit of its business interests, the
experimental use exemption did not apply. Additionally, although the
quantity of flurazepam hydrochloride was small, the use, if it led the
FDA to approve Bolar's NDA, would have the effect of reducing
Roche's effective term of marketing exclusivity by six months and
cause a significant economic impact. 22 Therefore, the use was not de
minimis.
Bolar further argued that even if its activities did not fall within
the common law experimental use exemption, public policy dictated
that an exemption for bioequivalence testing of name brand pharma-
ceuticals before patent expiration should be created by the court.2 3 The
crux of Bolar's argument was that the time required for the generic
manufacturer to comply with the FDA approval process creates a sub-
stantial and indefinite de facto monopoly term after expiration of the
patent.24 Bolar argued that this de facto monopoly was against the
policy of the patent act, which intended to grant inventors a limited
and definite property right for seventeen years, after which the public
should enjoy the benefit of competition in the sale of the patented
invention. In response, the Federal Circuit noted that because the
active ingredient of most pharmaceutical drugs is patented prior to the
initiation of lengthy FDA-required testing, the effective term of phar-
maceutical marketing exclusivity may be as low as seven years. 26 Fur-
thermore, the Federal Circuit noted that proposals for pharmaceutical
patent term restoration and a fast-track approval process for generic
drugs were before Congress.27 Crafting an infringement exemption for
generic drug testing would require the court to balance the economic
and social interests of pioneer drug patentees, generic drug manufac-
21 Id. at 863 (alteration in original) (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. CI. 1976)).
22 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 864.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 865 (citing Drug Price Competition Act of 1983, H.R. 3605, 98th
Cong. (1983) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) to allow faster marketing of new generic
drugs equivalent to approved new drugs); Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983, S.
1306, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REc. S6863 (1983) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2) to
add to the patent grant a period of time equivalent to that lost due to regulatory delay);
Text of Patent Term Restoration Bill and Introductory Comments, 26 PAT.
TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 87, 87-88 (1983).
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turers, and the public. According to the Federal Circuit, such balanc-
1128ing was "legislative activity proper only for the Congress.
In light of the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche, as well as the
related issues of effective patent term loss caused by the time spent in
the regulatory approval process and the desire to streamline regulatory
approval of generic drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in
1984.29 The Hatch-Waxman Act made a number of changes in the
patent and food and drug laws and profoundly affected the way that
the pharmaceutical industry operates. 30 In order to increase competi-
tion and accelerate market entry by generic drug manufacturers and,
thus, lower prices on pharmaceutical products, a new regulatory re-
view process for generic drugs-the abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA)-was created. The ANDA process is available to generic
drugs that are used to treat the same medical conditions and contain
the same active ingredients administered by the same route in identi-
cal strength and dosage form as the pioneer drug.31 The regulatory
approval process for generic drugs is "abbreviated" because the
generic manufacturer is not required to repeat lengthy and costly
safety and efficacy testing required of the pioneer drug manufacturer
as part of the Investigational New Drug Application (IND) 32 and New
28 Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
29 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (2000); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 355, 360cc (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. 2003);
35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 282 (2000)). The "safe harbor" provision is contained in 35 U.S.C.
§ 27 1(e)(1) (2000).
30 Brian D. Coggio & F. Dominic Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision of the
Hatch-Waxman Act: Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International Considera-
tions, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 161 (2002).
31 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic Drugs,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/#Introduction (last visited on Apr. 9, 2007).
32 The purpose of the IND application process is to allow the FDA to deter-
mine whether it is reasonable to proceed with human trials of the drug. Food & Drug
Admin., 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2005). In order to make this determination, the FDA
requires the IND applicant to submit several types of information. Because the rea-
sonableness of performing clinical trials depends on the nature of the testing, the
applicant must submit an investigational plan, including the protocol for the conduct
of each proposed clinical trial and the identity and qualifications of the clinical inves-
tigators. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(6). The applicant must submit chemistry, manufactur-
ing, and control information sufficient to ensure the proper identification, quality,
purity, strength, and stability of the drug as needed to carry out the proposed clinical
testing. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(7). The applicant must submit, if known, a description
of the pharmacological effects and mechanism of action of the drug, including
pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic information related to drug absorption, dis-
tribution, metabolism, and excretion. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8)(i). Toxicology
information based on animal and in vitro studies must be submitted. 21 C.F.R. §
312.23(a)(8)(ii)-(iii). Finally, any previous experience with the investigational drug in
[Vol. 17:377
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Drug Application (NDA)33 processes. Instead, the generic manufac-
turer must show that the generic drug is bioequivalent to the pioneer
drug, i.e., the generic drug performs in the same manner as the pioneer
drug, and that the manufacturing process used by the generic manu-
facturer meets the same requirements for identity, strength, purity, and
quality as required for innovator products under FDA good manufac-
humans, such as foreign clinical trials, must be submitted. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(9).
In reviewing the IND, the FDA's primary objective is to ensure the safety and rights
of the human test subjects and to assure that the scientific quality of the testing proto-
col will permit an effective evaluation of the investigational drug's safety and effi-
cacy. 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a). Thus, while the efficacy of the investigational drug in
animal and in vitro testing forms a part of the IND submission, it is not the primary
focus of the review process. Id.
33 The NDA application process includes the conduct of clinical trials, fol-
lowed by an evaluation by the FDA of the cumulative information obtained during
clinical and preclinical testing. In phase I trials, a small number (less than 100) of
healthy subjects are given the investigational drug in low doses. Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Investigational New Drug Application http://www.fda.gov/
cder/handbook/indbox.htm (last visited on Apr. 15, 2006). The purpose of the phase I
trial is to collect pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data in humans in order to
determine appropriate dosing in later clinical trials and to identify any acute side
effects. Id. In phase 2 trials, a larger group of volunteers (100-300) who have a condi-
tion or disease that the investigational drug is intended to treat is given the drug in
order to further evaluate safety and determine whether the drug shows signs of
efficacy against the condition or disease. Id. If phase 2 trials indicate that the investi-
gational drug is at least somewhat efficacious and the risks of further trials are accept-
able, phase 3 trials may be undertaken to obtain additional information about efficacy
and safety. Id. Phase 3 trials involve a larger number of test subjects with the disease,
usually between one and three thousand. Id. During the clinical trials process, the
FDA actively monitors the conduct of the clinical trials. 21 C.F.R. § 312.87. In order
to facilitate this monitoring, the applicant must comply with annual reporting
requirements on the progress of the clinical testing program, as well as updating the
FDA with any information relating to adverse safety indications in trial participants or
changes to the testing protocol. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.30, 312.32, 312.33. After clinical
trials are complete, a request for marketing approval is submitted to the FDA in a
NDA. The NDA includes information related to the investigational drug's clinical
trial results, including pharmacokinetic and bioavailability, efficacy and safety results,
and a summary of risks and benefits of treatment with the investigational drug. Food
& Drug Admin., 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(5)(i)-(viii), 314.50(d)(6)(i), 320 (2005); CTR,
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDELINE FOR THE
FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE HUMAN PHARMACOKINETICS AND BIOAVAILABILITY
SECTION OF AN APPLICATION (1987), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
old071fn.pdf. Chemistry, manufacturing, and packaging information is also submit-
ted. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COMPARABILITY PROTOCOLS - PROTEIN
DRUG PRODUCTS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS - CHEMISTRY, MANUFACTURING, AND




turing practice regulations.34  Bioequivalence is frequently
demonstrated by administering the generic drug to a small number of
healthy volunteers and plotting the concentration of the drug in the
bloodstream over time.35 "The generic version [of the drug] must de-
liver [roughly] the same amount of active ingredients into a patient's
bloodstream [over] the same amount of time as the innovator drug., 36
To enable the generic drug manufacturer to begin sales of the
generic drug immediately upon expiration of the pioneer drug patent,
the generic manufacturer must satisfy the good manufacturing and
bioequivalence requirements of the ANDA process prior to patent
expiration. Hatch-Waxman addressed this problem by creating the
"safe harbor" provision embodied in 271(e)(1), permitting the
infringement of a patented invention for uses reasonably related to the
submission of information under federal law regulating the sale of
drugs.
37
Hatch-Waxman also benefited pioneer drug patentees. In order to
address the loss of pharmaceutical patent terms due to the lengthy
NDA process, the term of patents claiming products subject to a pre-
market regulatory review period, e.g., pharmaceutical drugs that must
undergo clinical trials before they can be marketed, is eligible for an
increase corresponding to the regulatory review period up to a maxi-
mum of five years.38 For pharmaceutical products, this term extension
would usually be longer than the de facto term of exclusivity enjoyed
under pre-1984 law, resulting in a net increase in the monopoly term
for pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers. 39 Hatch-Waxman also cre-
ated a statutory action for patent infringement based on ANDA filings
in which the applicant certifies that any patents on the pioneer drug
34 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration,
Drug Applications: Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Process for Generic
Drugs http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/ANDA.htm (last visited on
Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter ANDA for Generic Drugs]; Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, supra note 31.
35 ANDA for Generic Drugs, supra note 34.
36 id.
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
38 35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. 2003). The expiration of the patent term may not
occur more than five years past the original expiration date of the patent or fourteen
years after the date of marketing approval. 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c)(3), 156(d)(5)(E)(i)
(2000).
39 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals:
Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 419-20 (1999) (citing CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE U.S., How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY




are invalid or not infringed.40 These Hatch-Waxman infringement
suits have special injunctive remedies benefiting the pioneer drug
patentee as well as incentives for the first generic manufacturer who
enters the market.4 '
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 271(E)(1) PRIOR
TO MERCK V. INTEGRA
Determining the scope of the infringement exemption created by
271(e)(1) requires the resolution of three principle questions: (1) what
kind of uses are exempted from infringement?; (2) which types of
regulatory information submissions does the exemption apply to?; and
(3) what patented inventions fall within the infringement exemption?
Because the statute itself is not "an elegant piece of statutory drafts-
manship, ' 42 significant judicial effort has been expended resolving its
proper scope in light of the statutory language and the legislative
history of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
A. What Uses are "Reasonably Related"?
One early issue requiring resolution was the meaning of the
phrase "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law. '' 3 With respect to the
use of the word "solely," at least two interpretations are possible.
"Solely" can be read either to modify the term "reasonably related" or
the term "uses." If "solely" is read to modify "reasonably related," the
statute would effectively read, "[F]or uses that are solely reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law."44 However, if "solely" modifies "uses," the statute
40 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000) (setting forth the certification
requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) (creating the cause of action for infringe-
ment).
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) (2000) (stating that "injunctive relief may be
granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell,
or sale within the United States or importation into the United States of an approved
drug or veterinary biological product"); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000) (granting
thirty-month stay during which the ANDA may not issue); 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (granting generic applicants that successfully challenge the
validity of a patent on a brand-name drug a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity).
42 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990).
4' 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(l) (2000).
44 See Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act's Safe Harbor,
57 Food & Drug L.J. 475, 484 (2002) (emphasis removed).
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would effectively read, "[flor uses that are reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law. 45
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech,46 an early
case to consider this issue, the court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia adopted the narrower interpretation of this language, reading
"solely" as modifying "reasonably related." In Scripps Clinic, Scripps
sued Genentech alleging infringement of claims relating to purifying
and recovering a concentrated form of Factor VII:C, a protein related
to blood clotting, from human blood plasma.47 Genentech moved for
dismissal or summary judgment of non-infringement under 271(e)(1),
arguing that its allegedly infringing conduct was reasonably related to
meeting FDA requirements and, thus, exempt from infringement.
48
However, aspects of Genentech's infringing conduct implicated pur-
poses beyond meeting FDA requirements, including preparation of a
European patent application, development of a process for manufac-
turing Factor VII:C on a commercial scale, sales of Factor VIII:C,
and the making of an agreement contemplating the marketing of re-
combinant Factor VII:C outside the United States before expiration
of the Scripps patent.49
Reviewing the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
court cited the House Report, which described the exemption in terms
of its application to generic manufacturers and stated that "'the only
activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of test-
ing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of
a generic substitute. ' ' 50 The House Report further noted that the inter-
ference with the rights of the patent holder would not be substantial,
an expression of legislative intent that would be honored by adopting
a narrower construction of the infringement exemption. 5' The court
remarked that Genentech's preferred reading of the statute would ef-
fectively eliminate the express statutory limitation "solely for."W
52
Thus, the court held that 271 (e)(1) exempted only those activities that
were solely related to the development and submission of information
45 See id; see also, infra note 58 (arguing that interpreting the word "solely"
to modify the term "uses" renders the word "solely" redundant and meaningless).
46 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379,
1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Federal Circuit's
opinion did not address the 271 (e)(1) issue. Id.
47 Id. at 1382.
48 Id. at 1396.
49 Id.
50 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-857, (1984), reprinted in 1984





to the FDA. As Genentech's activities were related to other activities,
they were infringing.
Four years later, the narrow interpretation of 271(e)(1) advanced
in Scripps Clinic was abandoned for a broader one. In Intermedics,
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,53 Intermedics filed a patent infringement suit
against Venitrex, which asserted 271(e)(1) as a defense. Venitrex was
alleged to have infringed Intermedics's patents by carrying out vari-
ous activities related to Venitrex's implantable defibrillator.54
Intermedics contended that a number of these activities, such as the
continued sale of defibrillators to hospitals for use in clinical trials
after Venitrex submitted its application for pre-market approval to the
FDA, were not solely related to the development and submission of
information to the FDA.55
The Intermedics court declined to read the infringement exemp-
tion narrowly and focused on the positive creation of the exemption
for uses reasonably related to submission to the FDA rather than the
limitation that those uses be solely for that purpose. According to the
court, a focus on the "solely" limitation would require an inquiry into
the subjective intent of the user in order to determine whether the
infringing use was for an impermissible purpose.56 Textual support for
the proposition that the 271(e)(1) analysis should be an objective one
is found in the use of the term "reasonably related," language that is
customarily associated with objective standards.57 According to the
Intermedics court, the proper analysis of a claim of exemption from
infringement should focus "solely" on those uses that would otherwise
be infringing.58 Those uses are "reasonably related" to the develop-
ment and submission to the FDA if:
53 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
affd, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
14 Id. at 1281-85.
I d. at 1281-82.
56 Id. at 1274-75.
I Id. at 1280.
58 Id. at 1277. The major problem with this reading of the statute is that it
renders the term "solely" redundant and meaningless. Put another way, the court's
interpretation is that the infringement exemption applies "solely" to the infringing
uses that the statute exempts from infringement liability. While this reading seems
correct as a grammatical matter and reaches a desirable result with regard to applying
the 271(e)(1) exemption objectively, it ignores the obvious inference that Congress
intended the word "solely" to function as a limitation on the scope of the exemption.
See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1395-
96 (N.D. Cal. 1987). While Congress may have intended the exemption to be narrow,
poor draftsmanship and a seeming failure to consider the application of the plain
language of the statute to FDA regulatory data submissions other than ANDA filings
has left courts with an inadequate textual basis to limit a broad application of the
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[I]t [would] have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in
defendant's situation to believe that there was a decent pros-
pect that the "use" in question would contribute (relatively di-
rectly) to the generation of kinds of information that was
likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would
decide whether to approve the product[.] If [so,] it should not
matter that other reasonable persons might have concluded
that FDA approval could be secured even without the infor-
mation in question. 59
According to the Intermedics court, this broad interpretation of
the statute was consistent with the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which was to facilitate the rapid entry of potential competitors of pat-
ent holders into the market immediately following the expiration of
the relevant patents.60 By use of the flexible term "reasonably re-
lated," Congress "inten[ded] that the courts give parties some latitude
in making judgments about the nature and extent of the otherwise
infringing activities they would engage in as they sought to develop
information to satisfy the FDA."61 Because the development and regu-
latory approval procedures related to marketing drug products and
medical devices are complicated, expensive, and time consuming,
Congress should have been aware that activities related to FDA ap-
proval would have collateral effects on the business development and
promotional activities of the infringing party.62 Thus, exclusion of
infringing activities that are motivated in part by business purposes
from the infringement exemption under 271(e)(1) would be inconsis-
tent with the intent of Congress.
Ultimately, Venitrex escaped infringement liability because it was
able to show that it was reasonable to continue to generate clinical
data after submitting the initial application for pre-market approval to
the FDA. In another case involving the same defendant corporation,
Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,63 the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed summary judgment of noninfringement where Venitrex
had demonstrated its pacemakers to the public at medical conferences
and disclosed clinical trial data at a medical conference and in a pri-
vate fundraising document. Although Teletronics argued that these
exemption.
59 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280-81.
60 Id. at 1279.
61 Id. at 1280.
62 Id. at 1279.
63 See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1523-
24 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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uses were not reasonably related to the submission of information to
the FDA, the court found the use to be within the 271 (e)(1) exemption
because the demonstration was part of an effort to recruit clinical in-
vestigators, and the statute did not require that the data developed for
FDA submission not be disclosed.64
In NeoRx v. Immunomedics, Inc.65 the District Court for the
Northern District of New Jersey addressed the issue of whether the
manufacture and stockpiling of commercial "launch-quantity" stock-
piles of an infringing product was exempt under 271(e)(1). 66
Immunomedics filed eight investigational new drug (IND) applica-
tions for radiolabeled antibodies used to detect and treat cancer.67
Immunomedics had also filed a product license application (PLA),
seeking FDA approval to produce and market ImmuRAID-CEA, its
diagnostic tool for imaging colorectal cancer.68 NeoRx filed suit,
alleging that the products for which Immunomedics was seeking FDA
approval infringed its patents for radiolabeling proteins.69
The facts relating to Immunomedics's large-scale production of
the radiolabeled antibodies were not contested by the parties.
Immunomedics acknowledged that the production was in excess of
that required for their clinical testing needs and FDA approval of the
commercial-scale manufacturing processes but argued that the addi-
tional production was reasonably related to the FDA approval process
because the FDA was made aware of the additional production and
because there was some uncertainty as to how much information FDA
would need.70 The court agreed, finding the extra production fell
within the infringement exemption of 271 (e)(1) because "a prudent
applicant cannot know whether the FDA will require more data before
the application is granted. 71
Despite the finding that Immunomedics's excess production ac-
tivities fell within the infringement exemption of section 271(e)(1),
Immunomedics's subsequent use of the manufactured antibodies was
subject to an additional round of scrutiny. Immunomedics had shipped
antibodies overseas in order to perform foreign clinical trials, from
which the resulting data would be submitted to foreign regulatory
64 Id.
65 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
66 Id. at 206.
67 Id. at 204.
68 id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 206-07.
71 Id. at 207 (quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 808
(Fed. Cir. Cal. 1993)).
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agencies as well as the FDA.7 a A portion of this shipment was to be
submitted directly to the foreign regulatory agencies in order to seek
regulatory approval for non-U.S. markets. 3 Applying the standard set
forth in Intermedics, the court stated that the shipment of antibodies to
be used in foreign clinical trials was not deprived of the 271(e)(1)
exemption despite having a purpose in addition to the submission of
information to the FDA.7 4 However, to the extent that antibody sam-
ples were submitted to foreign regulatory bodies, that use was not
reasonably related to submission of information to the FDA and,
therefore, was not exempt from infringement.75
B. What Patented Inventions and What Submissions of Information?
Although the application of 271(e)(1) to ANDA-related clinical
testing of drugs is clear given the statutory text and legislative history,
it is less clear whether it should apply to medical device and preclini-
cal drug research that infringes patents on inventions not subject to
FDA approval. The courts that have considered these issues have
sometimes used language that conflates the questions of what pat-
ented inventions fall within the infringement exemption and what
types of information submissions and, thus, FDA regulated product
types trigger the application of the infringement exemption. For that
reason, these issues shall be considered together.
The text of 271(e)(1) ties the application of the infringement ex-
emption to the development and submission of information under "a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. 76
On its face, this language might seem to preclude the application of
271(e)(1) to infringing uses related to obtaining FDA marketing ap-
proval of medical devices. However, in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic,77 a
medical device manufacturer successfully convinced the Supreme
Court otherwise.
Medtronic was sued by Eli Lilly's predecessor-in-interest, which
sought to enjoin Medtronic from testing and marketing an implantable
cardiac defibrillator, a class III medical device.78 Medtronic defended
72 Id. at 207-08.
71 Id. at 207.
74 Id. (quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1282
(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
71 id. at 208.
76 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
77 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
78 Class III devices are the most stringently regulated category of devices;
they "are usually those that support or sustain human life, are of substantial impor-
tance in preventing impairment of human health, or which present a potential, unrea-
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on the ground that its activities were related to obtaining FDA ap-
proval for its devices under section 515 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and, thus, were exempted from infringe-
ment by 271(e)(1). Medtronic argued that because the FDCA as a
whole governs the regulation of drugs, and is, thus, a "federal law"
within the meaning of 271 (e)(1) and because the FDCA also regulates
medical devices, 271(e)(1) applied to medical devices. 79 This argu-
ment was rejected by the district court, which read the last clause of
271 (e)(1) as limiting the exemption of infringement of patented inven-
tions to patented drug inventions.
80
The Federal Circuit, hearing the case on interlocutory appeal, re-
versed, reasoning that 271(e)(1) was meant to legislatively reverse
their interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) in Roche and to
create a statutory experimental use exemption for the types of testing
found to infringe in that case.81 Because the distinction between drugs
and medical devices was not relevant to the holding in Roche, and no
persuasive reason was suggested to the court as to why Congress
would create an exception with respect to drugs only, the court held
that "section 271(e)(1) allows a party to make, use, or sell any type of
'patented invention' if 'solely' for the restricted uses stated therein., 82
The Supreme Court also found medical devices to be within the
scope of 271(e)(1), using a different analysis to determine that the
relevant federal law regulating drugs within the meaning of 271 (e)(1)
was in fact the broader FDCA and not the narrower set of statutes that
specifically regulate drugs and not medical devices. According to the
Supreme Court, the phrase "a patented invention" in 271 (e)(1) should
be read as including all inventions, not merely drug-related ones.83
Thus, the class of patented inventions that may be infringed without
liability under 271(e)(1) is determined only by the fact that their in-
fringement must be reasonably related to the submission of informa-
tion under a federal law.
After reviewing several unpersuasive arguments relating to
whether the statutory language referring to a federal law regulating
drugs should be read to refer to the broader FDCA or only to those
sonable risk of illness or injury." CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEVICE CLASSES, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/
devadvice/3132.html (last visited on Apr. 2, 2007).
7' Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 664.
80 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
aff'd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
"I Id. at 405-6.
82 Id. at 406.
83 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(a)).
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statutes that regulate drugs, Justice Scalia, writing for a 6-2 majority,
concluded that the statute "somewhat more naturally reads" to refer to
the FDCA but was "not plainly comprehensible on anyone's view."
' 4
Given the lack of clear direction in the statutory language and an am-
biguous legislative history, the Court resorted to an analysis of the
Hatch-Waxman Act as a whole.
85
According to the Court, Congress intended to remedy both the
front-end distortion arising from the loss of patent term during the
pre-market approval period and the back-end distortion (described by
Roche) on the effective patent term of FDA regulated products with
the complementary statutory provisions of sections 271(e)(1) and
156.86 In contrast to the Federal Circuit's view of 271(e)(1) as purely a
legislative reversal of Roche, the Supreme Court chose to view the
two provisions as parts of a single legislative package.8 7 Because sec-
tion 156 enables patent term extension for class III medical devices as
well as drugs, an interpretation of 271(e)(1) that covers both types of
regulated products creates a "perfect product fit" between the two
88sections. Under this analysis, the set of regulated products that
receive an increase in patent term under the term extension provisions
of section 156 is identical to the set of regulated products for which
the de facto patent term extension is eliminated by 271(e)(1). Since
class HI medical devices are subject to the same patent term distor-
tions as drugs, the Court thought it likely that Congress intended to
treat the two classes of regulated products identically. 89
The Court recognized that there would be "relatively rare situa-
tions" in which a patentee would obtain the benefit of section 156 but
not suffer the disadvantage of 271(e)(1) or would suffer the disadvan-
tage of 271 (e)(1) but not obtain the benefit of section 156.90 However,
such a result in the case of an individual product is dictated by the
unique facts of a particular patentee's experience with respect to the
actions of the FDA and its competitors, not the relevant sections of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. In any event, the Court found such an outcome
to be more satisfactory than an interpretation of 271(e)(1) that did not
extend the statutory symmetry created for drug products to class I
medical devices.91
84 Id. at 669.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 669-70.
87 Id. at 670 n.3.
81 Id. at 673-74.
81 Id. at 672.
90 Id. at 671-72.
9' Id. at 672.
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Seven years later, in AbTox v. Exitron,92 the Federal Circuit sub-
sequently extended the holding of Eli Lilly to class I and II medical
devices, which, unlike class III devices, are not subject to a rigorous
pre-market approval process and, therefore, do not benefit from the
patent term extension provisions of section 156.93 Despite the
Supreme Court's seeming reliance in Eli Lilly on the "'perfect product
fit"' between sections 156 and 271(e)(1) to reach the result of that
case, the Federal Circuit read Eli Lilly to express a broad holding
identical to its own rationale in that case-that the statutory language
of 271(e)(1) refers to the FDCA as a whole and, therefore, includes all
classes of medical devices regulated under the FDCA.94 The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that this "broad holding" conflicted with the
Supreme Court's "narrower" analysis but dismissed this conflict by
assuming that the Supreme Court expressed a mere preference, rather
than a requirement, for statutory symmetry.95
The question of whether statutory symmetry between sections 156
and 271 (e)(1) is relevant to the interpretation of the scope of 271 (e)(1)
has ramifications beyond the question of whether activities related to
obtaining FDA approval of class I and II medical devices fall within
the exemption. Section 156 grants a term extension to patents that
claim products subject to pre-market regulatory approval by the
FDA.9 6 However, 271 (e)(1) exempts infringement of patented inven-
tions for activities reasonably related to developing and submitting
information that will be used to obtain FDA approval to market cer-
tain types of products. If, as the Eli Lilly Court suggested, the legisla-
tive compromise at the heart of the Hatch-Waxman Act was a grant of
patent term extension under section 156 to pioneer drug patentees in
response to their demand to be compensated for the loss of de facto
term extension under 271 (e)(1), the two sections should be understood
to apply to the same class of patented inventions. Therefore, under
this view, 271(e)(1) must be read to exempt the infringement of the
limited class of patented inventions that claim products subject to
regulatory approval within the meaning of section 156. This narrow
reading of 271(e)(1) stands in stark contrast with the broader interpre-
tation of Eli Lilly-that the statutory term "a patented invention"
92 AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
93 Id. at 1028-30.
94 Id. at 1029 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673-
74 (1990)).
95 id.
96 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2000).
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means that any patented invention may be infringed so long as the
other requirements of 271 (e)(1) are met. 97
That different results may be reached in 271(e)(1) cases depend-
ing on whether the "broad" or "narrow" holding of Eli Lilly is fol-
lowed was demonstrated by two subsequent district court cases, one
of which involved preclinical drug discovery research. 98 In Bristol-
Meyers Squibb v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, the first of these cases,
Rhone-Poulenc Roher (Rhone) moved for partial summary judgment
of infringement based on Bristol-Myers Squibb's (Bristol-Myers) use
of its patented chemical intermediates.99 Rhone's patent claimed semi-
synthetic processes and chemical intermediates used for the synthesis
of taxol, a leading anti-cancer drug. 1°° At the time of infringement,
Bristol-Myers had the exclusive right to market taxol within the
United States.'0 ' Bristol-Myers sought to develop a new and improved
taxol derivative that could become the pre-eminent anti-cancer drug
upon expiration of its exclusive rights to market taxol.10 2 As part of
their development effort, Bristol-Myers synthesized hundreds of new
taxol analogs using Rhone's patented intermediates as starting
materials. 1
0 3
In response to Rhone's motion, Bristol-Myers argued that its ac-
tivities were exempted from infringement under 271(e)(1). Agreeing
with Bristol-Myers, the district court rejected Rhone's argument that
271(e)(1) should not apply because Rhone's patented intermediates
were not covered by section 156.1°4 The district court found no such
limitation in section 271(e)(1), noting the Supreme Court's holding in
Eli Lilly that "a patented invention" under 271(e)(1) referred to all
inventions, as well as the Federal Circuit's decisions in AbTox and
Chartex International v. M.D. Personal Products, 105 which interpreted
the phase "patented inventions" according to its plain meaning.
10 6
Accordingly, Rhone's motion for partial summary judgment was de-
nied on the grounds that a jury could find that Bristol-Myers's activi-
ties "were 'reasonably related to the development and submission of
97 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 100(a)).
98 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ.
8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
9' Id. at *1.
o id. at *3.
101 Id. at *14.
102 id.
103 Id.
'04 Id. at *23.
105 Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prod. Corp., 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
106 Bristol-Meyers, 2001 U.S. Dist. 19361, at 6-9.
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information"' of an IND application for approval to conduct clinical
trials on a taxol analog.
10 7
In contrast, another district court denied the defendant's motion
for partial summary judgment for non-infringement on the basis of
section 27 1(e)(1) in Infinigen v. Advanced Cell Technology'0 8 because
the infringed patented invention, which related to cloning technology,
did not claim a product eligible for term extension under section 156.
Relying on Eli Lilly, the court reasoned that Congress enacted sections
156 and 271(e)(1) as part of a single legislative bargain, and thus
sections 156 and 271(e)(1) apply to the same class of patented inven-
tions-those embodied by products subject to a pre-marketing regula-
tory review period. °9
The conflict between the Supreme Court's "narrow" rationale in
Eli Lilly and the Federal Circuit's subsequent dismissal of the princi-
ple that statutory symmetry between sections 156 and 271(e)(1) im-
poses a limitation on what patents are exempted from infringement
under 271(e)(1) is a principle source of uncertainty over the scope of
the 271(e)(1) exemption. The ability to infringe any patent without
liability in the context of testing in support of an ANDA is not par-
ticularly troubling with respect to the potential effects on the rights of
patentees because of the extremely limited nature of such testing.110
However, as the 271(e)(1) exemption has since been applied to activi-
ties related to other FDA regulatory data submissions, such as INDs,
which involve much broader experimentation and testing, the lack of a
limitation on the types of patented inventions that fall within the
271(e)(1) exemption, combined with an open-ended interpretation of
the reasonable relationship requirement that permits any activities that
relate in some way to developing a product that will ultimately be the
subject of an application to the FDA for marketing approval, creates a
situation where the 271(e)(1) exemption may deprive large classes of
patented inventions of their economic value."' Although this looming
problem was identified by the Federal Circuit in Merck v. Integra, the
Supreme Court's decision in that case does not provide a basis for
resolving this issue, leaving substantial uncertainty as to whether there
are any limitations on the types of patented inventions that are ex-
empted from infringement under 271 (e)(1).
107 Id. at *10, *27-28 (quoting 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, at 2678).
108 Infinigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 967, 980 (W.D.
Wis. 1999).
"09 Id. at 979-80.110 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.




III. MERCK V. INTEGRA
The dispute in Merck centered on a number of patents owned by
Integra Lifesciences, a company that develops, manufactures, and
markets a wide variety of medical devices."l 2 The patents at issue (the
RGD patents), arose out of research conducted by Drs. Erkki
Ruoslahti and Michael Pierschbacher, scientists at the Burnham Insti-
tute, a non-profit medical research organization." 3 Ruoslahti and
Pierschbacher discovered that peptides containing the RGD se-
quence 1 4 (RGD peptides) play an important role in cell adhesion. 115
Specifically, the RGD peptides promote cell adhesion to substrates
containing the RGD peptide sequence by interacting with aB 3 recep-
tors on cell surface proteins called integrins. 16 RGD Peptides have
been the subject of extensive biomedical research, with potential ap-
plications in the treatment of solid tumors, diabetic retinopathy, rheu-
matoid arthritis, psoriasis, and inflammatory bowel disease.
1 7
Armed with their discovery, Ruoslahti and Pierschbacher left the
Burnham Institute in order to form Telios Pharmaceuticals and ob-
tained further patents on the RGD peptides.l' On the strength of these
patents, Telios raised venture capital in order to continue research into
commercial applications of RGD peptides and entered into agree-
ments with other companies licensing their RGD peptide technol-
ogy. 119 One of the companies that Telios sought to negotiate a license
agreement with was Merck, who Telios contacted in early 1994 re-
garding its use of RGD peptides.120 Licensing negotiations between
Merck and Telios took place throughout 1994, with Merck at one time
expressing interest in possibly acquiring Telios. 12 1 These negotiations
112 Integra.com, Integra Corporate Profile, http://www.integra-ls.com/
corporate-info/profile.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2006); Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.
Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-B(AJB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
113 INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES HOLDING CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at
11 (2004), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/1999/03/31/18/0000889812-99-00
1063/Section2.asp.
114 RGD denotes an amino acid sequence containing Arginine-Glycine-
Aspartate. Integra, 331 F.3d at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
115 Integra, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *5-6.
116 Integra, 331 F.3d at 862.
117 Integra, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725. at *5-6.
118 Id. at *6.
119 Id. Ultimately, Telios was unable to develop its patented RGD peptide
technology into a drug candidate suitable for clinical trials. Integra, 331 F.3d at 862-
63.




continued through 1995, when Integra Lifesciences purchased Telios,
and into the spring of 1996, at which point Merck informed
Telios/Integra that it was not interested in entering into an agreement
to license the RGD Peptides.1
22
On December 30, 1994, Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist at The
Scripps Research Institute, published an article in Cell indicating he
had developed a monoclonal antibody that successfully reversed tu-
mor growth in chicken embryos by blocking aB 3 receptors on the
surface of cells, thus, inhibiting angiogenesis, the process by which
new blood vessels are generated. 123 Subsequently, Cheresh was also
able to demonstrate that EMD 66203, a cyclic RGD peptide that had
been supplied to Scripps by Merck,124 was also able to reverse tumor
growth. 25 Inhibiting angiogenesis showed promise as a cancer ther-
apy by which the growth of fast-growing tumors could be slowed by
denying them a blood supply. 126 In 1995, Merck entered into an
agreement with Cheresh and Scripps to fund research into the anti-
angiogenetic properties of RGD peptides. l2 7 In exchange for a pledge
of six million dollars over three years, Scripps researchers would con-
duct the experiments necessary to satisfy FDA requirements for the
initiation of clinical trials in humans of EMD 66203 or a derivative
thereof. 28 The agreement contemplated that clinical trials would be-
gin within three years.
129
Scripp's research subsequently led to the discovery of two addi-
tional derivatives of EMD 66203 - EMD 85189 and EMD 121974.130
EMD 66203, 85189, and 121974 were then subjected to in vivo and in
vitro experiments to evaluate their specificity and efficacy for several
diseases, to determine their mechanisms of action, and to determine
the best mode of administration to produce the optimum therapeutic
effect.' 3' Further experiments generated toxicological and pharma-
cokinetic data. 132 Eventually, in 1997, EMD 121974 was selected as
122 Id. at *7-8.
123 Peter C. Brooks et al., Integrin 0413 Antagonists Promote Tumor Regres-
sion by Inducing Apoptosis of Angiogenic Blood Vessels, 79 CELL 1157 (1994).
124 Prior to the 1995 agreemment between Scripps and Merck, Merck had
supplied Cheresh with a library of drug candidates to be screened for anti-
angiogenesis activity. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
125 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2005).
126 Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
127 Integra, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *9.
128 Id.
129 Id.; Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2378.




the best candidate for clinical development. 133 In addition to the re-
search on RGD peptides, Dr. K. C. Nicolaou, another Scripps scien-
tist, was engaged by Merck in a program to design and synthesize
non-peptide integrin agonists. 134 These non-peptide agonists were
screened to determine their efficacy in purified receptor assays, cell
adhesion assays, and in vivo angiogenesis models, using the RGD
peptides already developed by Merck and Cheresh as positive con-
trols. 1
35
Eventually, Merck shared its research on RGD peptides with the
National Cancer Institute, which agreed to sponsor clinical research
into EMD 121974 and filed an IND application in 1998.136 Scripps
licensed the patent for Cheresh's monoclonal antibody to Ixsys, a
California Biotechnology company. Ixsys filed an IND on a human
version of the antibody, called Vitaxin, in 1996.137 The IND contained
the results of in vivo and in vitro tests run by Cheresh, and the FDA
approved Vitaxin for use in clinical research in 1997.
In 1996, aware of Merck's, Scripps's, and Cheresh's research
using RGD peptides, and with license negotiations with Merck having
failed, Telios/Integra filed a patent infringement suit, naming Merck,
Scripps, and Cheresh as defendants. 138 After a jury trial, the district
court held that Merck infringed four of Telios's patents and that
271(e)(1) did not immunize Merck's conduct. 139 The jury awarded a
reasonable royalty of fifteen million dollars. 14°
Merck appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district
court had incorrectly construed that the claims of Integra/Telios's
patents included cyclic RGD peptides, that the accused experiments
were immunized under 271(e)(1), and that the damage award was not
supported by substantial evidence.' 41 The Federal Circuit upheld the
133 Id.
134 Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd. and the Bumham Institute at *6, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421
F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 2005 WL 3609039 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2005) (Nos.
02-1052, 02-1065).
135 Id. at *6-7.
136 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, 125 S.Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005).
137 Id. at 2378 n.4.
138 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-B(AJB), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
139 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 864.
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district court's claim construction and interpretation of §271(e)(1),
although it reversed and remanded on the issue of damages. 1
42
With respect to Merck's claim that its activities were exempted
under 271(e)(1), the Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that
the question presented was a novel one for the court--does the
271(e)(1) exemption extend back down the chain of experimentation
to embrace pre-clinical research that aims to identify and develop new
drugs that will, in turn, be subject to FDA approval?143 Because the
exemption is limited by the statutory language "solely" to uses "rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of information" to
the FDA, the Federal Circuit reasoned that focus of the entire exemp-
tion is the provision of information to the FDA developed during
clinical testing.' 44 This renewed focus on the term "solely" contrasts
with the effective neutralization of the word "solely" under the
Intermedics reasonable relationship standard.1 45 The Federal Circuit
continued, noting that although the term "reasonably" would permit
some activities that are not the experiments that produce FDA infor-
mation, such activities "are already straining the relationship to the
central purpose of [271(e)(1)].'9146 Having signaled that, at least as it
relates to pre-clinical research, the reasonable relationship require-
ment has a role in narrowing the scope of the 271(e)(1) exemption
beyond the one contemplated by the Intermedics court, the Federal
Circuit proceeded to address the specific experimentation conducted
by Scripps and Merck.
The FDA, the Federal Circuit argued, had no interest in the hunt
for drugs that may or may not undergo clinical testing. 147 Rather, the
FDA's interest began with the submission of an IND, in which the
FDA does not require any information about drugs other than the
compound that is the subject of the application.148 The Federal Circuit
suggested that the research carried out by Scripps and Merck included
two distinct phases: an early phase in which drug candidates that
could effectively inhibit angiogenesis were developed and a second
phase, where the drug candidates developed in the first phase were
tested to determine their pharmacokinetic and safety profile and to
142 Id. Because they are outside the scope of this Note's discussion of the
court's 271(e)(1) analysis, the claim construction and damage calculation aspects of
the case will not be discussed further.
141 Integra, 331 F.3d at 865-66.
'44 Id. at 866.
145 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.





generate additional information about efficacy and mechanism of
action. 149 Because, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the information ob-
tained in the second, but not the first, research phase was the type
usually submitted in support of an IND application, the second phase
of research was "reasonably related" to obtaining FDA approval.
1 50
However, any experiments carried out by Scripps on compounds that
were ultimately not made the subject of an IND were only "general
biomedical research" and not "solely for uses reasonably related" to
submission of information to the FDA.
151
In support of its narrow reading of 271(e)(1) in the context of pre-
clinical drug discovery research, the court noted that the legislative
history and purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act informs the breadth of
the statutory test. 15 In overturning Roche, Congress intended to
exempt only those tests required to ensure the safety and effectiveness
of generic equivalents to drugs already on the market, that would con-
tribute relatively directly to the creation of information that the FDA
considers in approving a drug, and that would constitute a minimal
encroachment on the rights of the patentee. 1
53
The Federal Circuit also supplied a policy rationale for limiting
the scope of the 271(e)(1) exemption based on the potential effect on
biotechnology research tool patents, which "often facilitate general
research to identify candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-
related experiments on those new drugs."' 54 If 271(e)(1) were held to
"globally embrace all activity that at some point, however attenuated,
may lead to an FDA approval process," the value of patents for entire
categories of biotechnology inventions would be destroyed, a result
that is not supported by the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 1 5
5
Judge Pauline Newman, writing in dissent, argued that Scripps's
and Merck's conduct was exempted by 271(e)(1) as well as by the
common law research exemption. 56 According to Judge Newman,
271(e)(1) covered those experiments that produced information rele-
vant to the submission of an IND application, while any "discovery"
research beyond the scope of 271(e)(1) would be protected by the
149 Id. at 866-67. This analysis fails to recognize the recursive nature of drug
discovery. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
I5o Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67.
51 Id. at 868.
152 Id. at 866.
151 Id. at 867.
154 id.
155 id.
156 Id. at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). See also supra note 4.
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common law research exemption, with the two exemptions overlap-
ping seamlessly to shield the entire enterprise from infringement
liability.'57 Such a result, she argued, would be consistent with prior
case law interpreting the scope of 271(e)(1) and would also serve the
purpose of the common law research exemption-the promotion of
scientific progress through free experimentation. 5 8 In response to
Judge Newman's arguments, the majority noted that Merck did not
claim that the common law research exemption applied to its conduct,
and, thus, the issue was not properly before the court. 
59
Merck then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certio-
rari in order to consider the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
271(e)(1). In front of the Supreme Court, Integra conceded that
271(e)(1) exempted infringement reasonably related to the submission
of any information to the FDA, including IND applications, which
necessarily includes at least some preclinical testing.160 Integra's cen-
tral argument was that, in reviewing an IND application, the FDA's
only interest is in that information pertaining to the safety of the drug
in humans,' 61 and, therefore, Scripps's preclinical studies related to
efficacy, mechanism of action, mode of administration, pharmacoki-
netics, and toxicology were not reasonably included in an IND appli-
cation. 162
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, dismissed this char-
acterization of the IND process and the FDA's interest in preclinical
research data. Scalia noted that an ND applicant must include sum-
maries of nonclinical pharmacological, toxicological, pharmacoki-
netic, and biological testing in animals, specifically discussing the
methodology used and the relevance of the findings to any possible
unfavorable effects in humans.' 63 Because this information is submit-
ted before human trials are approved, this testing necessarily includes
in vitro and in vivo testing in animals (unless the drug has been tested
in humans outside the U.S.).' 64 Preclinical pharmacological and toxi-
cological studies are also considered by the FDA in order to determine
157 Id. at 877 (Newman, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at n.2.
160 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2372, 2380-81
(2005) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-69 (1990)).
161 Id. at 2381 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2005) (stating that the FDA's







whether proposed clinical trials would be reasonably safe. 165 Because
this reasonableness determination involves the weighing of potential
benefits as well as risks, preclinical efficacy studies are necessarily
included, even though it is not required that these studies be carried
out in conformity with FDA good laboratory practice regulations. 166
The Court also addressed the issue of whether general drug dis-
covery activities involving experimentation on patented compounds
that were not ultimately the subject of an IND or the use of patented
inventions in experiments that are not ultimately disclosed to the FDA
fell outside the scope of the 271(e)(1) exemption. The Court noted
that drug discovery and the FDA regulatory process are inherently
unpredictable activities. 67 If scientists knew which drug would per-
form adequately over the large number of experiments needed to sup-
port an IND, they would not need to conduct the experiments in the
first place. 68 To impose this requirement would be to effectively
eliminate the application of 271(e)(1) to non-ANDA regulatory fil-
ings. 169 Likewise, it is difficult to anticipate what information will be
needed by the FDA during the IND application process. 170 According
to the Supreme Court, the appropriate standard for determining
whether an infringing use of a patented compound in pre-clinical ex-
periments is "reasonably related" to the submission of an IND is
whether the researcher "has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented compound may work, through a particular biological process,
to produce a physiological effect, and uses the compound in research
that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to
the FDA.'
17 1
In response to the Federal Circuit's suggestion that a narrow in-
terpretation of the 271 (e)(1) exemption was necessary to avoid depriv-
ing research tool patents of their value, the Court noted that Integra
'65 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(3)(B)(i) (2005); Food & Drug Admin., 21
C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2005) (requiring disclosure by applicant); Food & Drug
Admin., 21 C.F.R. § 56.11 l(a)(2) (2005) (providing for review by institutional review
boards)).
"66 Id. at 2381-82 (noting that the FDA only requires the use of Good Labora-
tory Practices for experiments on drugs to determine their safety). Furthermore,
safety-related experiments may be included in an IND even if they are not conducted
using Good Laboratory Practices so long as they include "a brief statement of the
reason for the noncompliance." Id. at 2382 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 58.3(d) (2005)).
167 Id. at 2382-83.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 2383.
170 Id. (citing Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280
(N.D. Cal. 1991)). See also 21 C.F.R. 312.22(b) (2005).
171 Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2383.
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had never characterized the RGD peptides as research tools and that it
was apparent from the record that they were not. 72 Resolution of the
case did not require the Court to address the research tool issue, and it
declined to do SO.
173
The outcome of Merck was consistent with previous judicial
precedent interpreting 271(e)(1). An IND application is clearly a sub-
mission of information under a federal law which regulates drugs and,
therefore, is an appropriate predicate for a 271(e)(1) defense. The
RGD patents covered a drug invention subject to a pre-market regula-
tory review period, which, if developed by Telios/Integra and ap-
proved by the FDA, would qualify for patent term extension under
section 156. Thus, the RGD patents constituted a patented invention
that may be infringed under 271(e)(1), according to the broad holding
of Abtox as well as the narrower analysis of Eli Lilly. 7 4 Finally,
Scripps's uses met the standard of Intermedics because they could
have reasonably concluded that the experimentation at issue would
relatively directly contribute to the generation of the kinds of informa-
tion that would be relevant to an IND.
In the end, Merck does little to advance the state of the law with
respect to 271(e)(1) other than re-enforce the holdings of Eli Lilly and
Intermedics and definitively establish that those holdings apply to pre-
clinical drug discovery research. Although the Supreme Court set
forth a new standard for determining whether a use of a patented
compound is reasonably related to the submission of an IND, it is not
clear that it appreciably narrowed the scope of the Intermedics reason-
able relation standard. First of all, it seems unlikely that factual cir-
cumstances would ever exist such that a researcher would want to use
a patented compound in pre-clinical drug discovery research without
"a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work,
through a particular biological process, to produce a particular physio-
logical effect."' 175 Producing physiological effects through particular
172 Id. at 2382 n.7.
173 id.
174 Merck may be read to have resolved the issue of whether 271(e)(1) ex-
empts infringement of patented inventions that are eligible for patent term extension
under 35 U.S.C. § 156 or all patented inventions. The majority states that "[tihe Fed-
eral Food Drug and Cosmetic Act... 21 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq,, is 'a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."' Id. at 2377 (citing Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-66, 674 (1990)). Although not necessary to the
holding because the RGD peptides are clearly drug candidates eligible for term exten-
sion, this characterization of the FDCA implies that the Supreme Court views the
broader holding of Eli Lilly, as interpreted by the Federal Circuit in Abtox, as the
correct one. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
175 Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2383.
2007]
HEALTH MATRIX
biological processes is the essential activity of drug discovery re-
searchers whether the compound being used as a drug or a research
tool compound. Second, if the Supreme Court intended this language
to limit their broad interpretation of the 27 1(e)(1) exemption in Merck
to cases where patents covering drugs are being infringed, it failed to
clearly state such a limitation on its holding other than to disclaim that
it was deciding the research tool issue. 176
Despite this, Merck is significant because it raises several issues
of great importance to the future effects of 271(e)(1) on pharmaceuti-
cal research practices, particularly the licensing of research tools and
early stage pharmaceutical inventions. As the Federal Circuit in Merck
noted, at some point, the 271(e)(1) exception could potentially destroy
the commercial value of entire classes of biomedical patents.
Although the concerns of the Federal Circuit were directed primarily
towards the effect of 271(e)(1) on research tool patentees, an issue
that has already arisen in post-Merck litigation at the district court
level, 177 the Supreme Court opinion in Merck dealt a square blow to
the value of early stage pharmaceutical patents. 178
The potential harms of an overbroad application of 271(e)(1) to
preclinical drug discovery research activities clearly demonstrates the
need to develop a new rule for determining what types of infringe-
ment are exempted under 271(e)(1). Such a rule should limit the
potentially harmful effects of a broad operation of the statute while
remaining true to the core congressional purposes embodied in the
Hatch-Waxman Act-increasing competition within the pharmaceuti-
cal industry while providing strong incentives for pioneer drug
patentees. Because such a rule is not suggested by the plain text of
271(e)(1) and because the Supreme Court seems to be disinclined to
limit the scope of 271(e)(1) on non-textual grounds, legislative action
is the most desirable remedy.
176 See TIMOTHY J. SHEA, JR., MERCK KGAA v. INTEGRA: ANALYSIS OF THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON BIO-PHARMA COLLABORATIONS 15
(2005), http://www.skgf.com/media/news/news.215.pdf (questioning whether the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of § 271(e)(1) in Merck applies only when
activities that infringe drug patents are at issue).
177 The Court for the Northern District of Maryland has found the Supreme
Court's opinion in Merck to endorse an extension of the § 271(e)(1) exemption to
cover the use of patented research tools. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., v. King
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90806, *7 n.2 (D. Md. 2006) (granting
summary judgment of noninfringement to co-defendant Elan Pharmaceuticals on the
grounds that Elan's use of Classen Immunotherapies' patented research tools in
bioavailability studies of its muscle relaxant Skelaxin was immunized by § 271 (e)(l)).
178 See infra Part IV.
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IV. THE OPTIMAL SCOPE OF AN INFRINGEMENT
EXEMPTION FOR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO DRUG
DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT IS BEST
DETERMINED BY EXAMINING THE PRACTICES AND
METHODS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
IN LIGHT OF BROADER PATENT POLICIES
Under the prevailing judicial construction of 271(e)(1), almost all
drug discovery and development activities are exempted from patent
infringement. The predicate for exemption under 271(e)(1) is easily
met-all new drugs are subject to FDA regulatory approval, which is
obtained upon submission of information in the form of an IND,
NDA, or ANDA. Once this predicate is established, it is easy to dem-
onstrate a reasonable relationship of any experimental activity to the
submission of data to the FDA. After all, the entire commercial pur-
pose of a company engaged in drug discovery is to successfully com-
plete the FDA approval process. Any activity that is not reasonably
related to that goal would be counter to that purpose and economically
frivolous. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court held in Merck, because
drug discovery and the FDA regulatory process are inherently unpre-
dictable activities, 271(e)(1) exempts experimentation on patented
compounds that are not ultimately the subject of an IND or the use of
patented inventions in experiments that are not ultimately disclosed to
the FDA.179 Thus, experiments that seek to create, discover, and select
compounds for further development are within the scope of the
271(e)(1) exemption.
Given the seeming complete coverage of the exemption as cur-
rently construed, it is important to understand how the type of market
failure that led to the enactment of Hatch-Waxman relates to drug
development outside the ANDA context. Once this type of market
failure is characterized, several representative practices of the phar-
maceutical industry relating to the drug discovery and regulatory ap-
proval process will be examined with the goal of determining whether
public policies are best served by exempting such activities from pat-
ent infringement liability. These representative practices include bio-
equivalence studies used to support a generic drug approval, the use of
research tools in preclinical drug discovery, studies to elucidate undis-
closed information about competitors' drugs or drug candidates, the
use of patented compounds as positive controls, and comparative
experimentation on competitors' drugs or drug candidates undertaken
179 Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2382-83.
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in order to assess the competitive position of a preclinical drug
candidate.
A. Hatch-Waxman as a Remedy for Market Failure
In one sense, it can be argued that the 271(e)(1) exemption func-
tions to eliminate the possibility that the public's access to drugs will
be delayed by a patentee who strategically refuses to license a secon-
dary use (the primary use being the sale of the patentee's product to
the public) of their invention in order to prevent another party from
receiving FDA approval to enter the market with a non-infringing
competitive product.180 The incentive for pharmaceutical patentees to
engage in this type of behavior is especially intense given the astro-
nomical values associated with exclusive rights to market particular
drugs.' 81 According to this view, 271(e)(1) acts to remedy a market
failure in which pioneer drug manufacturers are subject to economic
incentives that discourage them from profitably licensing the use of
their patented products to generic manufacturers for use in bioequiva-
lence testing, thereby harming the public interest by delaying the
timely market entry of generic drugs.
This anti-competitive incentive does not apply only to pioneer
drug manufacturers who wish to exclude generic competitors from
selling a competitive formulation containing the same active ingredi-
ent after their patent expires; a pharmaceutical manufacturer also
stands to lose substantial profits when a non-infringing drug is
approved to treat the same medical indication that is treated by one of
the manufacturer's products. 182 Thus, an incentive exists for all phar-
maceutical manufacturers to strategically hinder the progress of other
manufacturers seeking to market a competing drug. This incentive
exists regardless of whether the competing drug contains an identical
active pharmaceutical ingredient and is the subject of an ANDA or
contains a different active ingredient and is, thus, subject to FDA
approval though the IND or NDA processes.
180 For example, before 271(e)(1) was enacted, a pioneer pharmaceutical
patentee could, by refusing to license its patent to a generic competitor for the secon-
dary use of bioequivalence testing, delay the market entry of a competitive product
(the generic drug) for a period of time when such market entry would not infringe the
pioneer's patent (i.e. the time between the patent's expiration and the FDA's approval
of the generic drug).
181 See, e.g., Scott Hensley, Side Effects: As Generics Pummel Its Drugs,
Pfizer Faces Uncertain Future, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at Al (stating that annual
sales of Pfizer's cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor are in excess of $12 billion).
182 See CBO REPORT, supra note 39, at ch. 3 pp. 20-21.
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However, elimination of the incentive to withhold licenses from
competitors is either not implicated or is overridden by competing
policies where the patentee is not a pharmaceutical manufacturer
seeking to delay a competitor's market entry but is a holder of a patent
on a research tool or early-stage invention. Research tool patentees
have no direct economic interest in delaying the FDA approval of any
product. Their interest is merely to extract value from their patent-
either from the sale or licensing of the research tool technology or by
exclusively exploiting the technology in their own drug discovery
programs. 
1 83
A slightly different and more complicated situation is presented in
the case of early-stage pharmaceutical inventions because such inven-
tions frequently develop into FDA-approved drug products, and the
same patents may be relevant at both stages. As a starting point, con-
sider the case in which the patented invention has not yet developed to
the stage where it is apparent that it will be embodied by a drug for
which FDA approval will be sought. In such a case, the principal
value of such a patent is that it may be sold or licensed to a party who
will use the invention to engage in further research and development
of a viable drug candidate or to leverage the patentee's exclusive abil-
ity to conduct such research as a means to raise venture capital.
These are essentially the facts of Merck. Telios originally ob-
tained venture capital financing on the strength of its RGD patents and
subsequently licensed the patents to other companies, using the money
obtained to fund its own, ultimately unsuccessful, preclinical devel-
opment program.1 84 It is worth noting that Telios actively sought to
license the RGD patents to Merck and, thus, could in no way be said
to have been acting as though they had a strategic interest in delaying
Merck's IND entry into the pharmaceutical market.185 Even if Telios
had not sought to license the RGD patents, such a strategy embodies
the normal prospect function 186 of the patent system, by which an
initial broad patent confers the right to the patentee to control and
coordinate subsequent research efforts and is not necessarily problem-
183 For further discussion of research tools and the 271(e)(1) exemption, see
infra notes 199-235 and accompanying text.
184 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-B(AJB), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
185 Id.
186 See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265 (1977) (comparing patents to mineral claims and arguing
that broad patents prevent appropriation of follow-on innovation opportunities and
allow patentees to coordinate subsequent development activities, leading to greater
efficiency through a reduction of duplicative research efforts).
20071
atic. 87 At any rate, it would not implicate the congressional policy of
forbidding the leveraging of patent rights in combination with the
FDA approval process to obtain defacto patent term extension.
At some stage in the development of an early-stage invention into
a viable pharmaceutical drug, the anti-competitive incentive that led to
the enactment of 271(e)(1)-a pharmaceutical manufacturer's desire
to strategically hinder the FDA approval process of a competitor
seeking to market a non-infringing drug for the same indication-does
come into play. The realization of such an incentive on the part of the
early-stage patentee is inherently subjective, but, at that point in time,
it can be safely assumed that the primary economic interest of the
patentee is as a future competitor in the pharmaceutical field, not as a
developer and licensee of early-stage inventions.
B. Bioequivalence Testing of Generic Drugs
It is appropriate to begin a discussion of drug discovery and de-
velopment practices with an examination of bioequivalence testing of
generic drugs because such testing is the activity that Congress most
clearly meant to exempt from infringement through passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.
188
The purpose of bioequivalence testing is to show that the generic
drug as formulated performs in the same manner as the pioneer
drug. 189 Bioequivalence is typically demonstrated by administering
the generic drug to a small number of healthy volunteers and plotting
the concentration of the drug in the bloodstream over time. 190 The
generic version of the drug must deliver roughly the same amount of
active ingredient into a volunteer's bloodstream over the same amount
of time as the innovator drug. 191 In order to increase the statistical
significance of the experimental results, the FDA recommends that
bioequivalence studies be designed as a crossover experiment. 192 In a
crossover experiment, each volunteer is administered the patented
version of the pioneer manufacturer's drug, and the concentration of
187 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 pp. 20-26 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Report] (discussing managed follow-on innovation).
188 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
19 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
192 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FOOD-EFFECT BIOAVAILABILITY AND FED BIOEQUIVALENCE
STUDIES 4-5 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/Guidance/5194fnl.pdf.
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the active pharmaceutical ingredient in the volunteer's bloodstream is
monitored.193 This administration is then followed by a washout
period, in which the drug and its physiological effects are cleared
from the system. Then, the generic manufacturer's formulation of the
drug is administered, and the concentration of the active pharmaceuti-
cal ingredient in the volunteer's bloodstream is monitored. 194 Because
both versions of the drug were administered to each volunteer, the
experimental results can be standardized for variability in the metabo-
lisms of different volunteers.
95
The nature of generic drug bioequivalence testing is illustrative of
several issues that are relevant to the application of an infringement
exemption to other types of drug discovery and development activi-
ties. First, the patent being infringed claims a pioneer drug. Because
pioneer drugs are products subject to a pre-market regulatory review
period, the infringed patent is eligible for term extension under section
156. Thus, the same party that benefits from the term extension provi-
sions of the Hatch-Waxman Act bears the loss of the right to exclude
the generic manufacturer from using the patented invention. 96 Be-
cause the increase in marketing exclusivity due to section 156 and
other provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act is in most cases longer
than the pre-Hatch-Waxman de facto term extension that arose from
the ability of the pioneer manufacturer to prevent generic manufactur-
ers from performing bioequivalence studies until the pioneer drug
patents expire, this effectively increases the incentive provided by the
patent system as a whole.
197
Furthermore, the patented invention is actually used for two dis-
tinct purposes in the crossover experiment: one use of the patented
pioneer drug is as an internal reference standard or positive control,
and, in a second use, the generic manufacturer's infringing formula-
tion of the patented drug is the subject of the experiment and the FDA
application it supports. However, in accordance with the ANDA certi-
fication process, the FDA will not approve public sale of the generic
formulation prior to the date of either the expiration or the invalida-
tion of the pioneer manufacturer's patents covering the generic formu-
193 Id. at 6.
194 Id. at5.
"9 See id. at 6-8; SHEIN-CHUNG CHOW & JUN SHAO, STATISTICS IN DRUG
RESEARCH: METHODOLOGIES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 24-25 (2002) (discussing
the difference between individual and population bioequivalence).
196 This is an example of the "perfect product fit" described in Eli Lilly v.
Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1990), discussed supra notes 88-89 and accompa-
nying text.
197 Engelberg, supra note 39 at 419-20.
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lation. 198 Thus, although the infringing use may have significant
commercial effects on the pioneer drug patentee, those effects are
channeled and made more predictable by other provisions of the
patent law.
C. Research Tools
As previously noted, research tools are patented tools used by sci-
entists to develop new pharmaceutical products that do not themselves
incorporate the tool.199 A number of patented and unpatented research
tools are typically used throughout the drug discovery and develop-
ment process in order to synthesize or isolate new drug candidates as
well as to screen such drug candidates for efficacy and safety. Some
examples of notable research tools are: a cellular assay used to deter-
mine the selectivity of COX-1 and COX-2 inhibitors developed by
scientists at the University of Rochester, which helped enable the de-
velopment of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as Celebrex
and Vioxx that provide relief from pain and inflammation without
gastrointestinal side effects associated with nonselective COX inhibi-
tors2°°; the Harvard oncomouse, a transgenic mouse that is particularly
prone to developing cancer and is useful in testing the pharmacologi-
cal effects of anticancer drugs 201; and Taq, an enzyme used in PCR
technology, a basic method of amplifying and reproducing DNA se-
quences that underlies much of modern genetic technology. 0 2 The
'9' 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000) (setting forth the certification
requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) (creating a cause of action for construc-
tive infringement when a generic manufacturer certifies its belief that the pioneer
manufacturer's patent is invalid).
199 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 1.
200 Thomas H. Maugh II, New Drugs Attack Pain of Arthritis, L.A. TtMEs,
Dec. 17, 1998, at B2; U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Apr. 11,
2000); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219-20
(W.D.N.Y. 2003), aftd, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a reach-through
claim on a COX-2 assay invalid for failure to satisfy the written description require-
ment of 35 U.S.C § 112).
201 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
See Sasha Blaug et al., Managing Innovation: University-Industry Partnerships and
the Licensing of the Harvard Mouse, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 762 (2004);
John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS iN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 307-08 (Wesley
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merril eds., 2003); Victoria Slind-Flor, Can These Mice Be
Saved?; Fenwick Lawyers Say That DuPont's Licensing Terms Are Preventing
Researchers from Using the Harvard Mouse, IP L. & Bus., Sept. 30, 2004, at 11.
202 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 2-3 (discussing an infringement suit against
a number of universities and scientists who purchased Taq from an unlicensed vendor
and used it in potentially profitable research).
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importance of any particular research to drug discovery may vary
widely. Key technologies such as PCR may be essential to the entire
field of biotechnology, while others such as the COX selectivity assay
may have application only for the development of drugs to treat a lim-
ited set of medical indications or new drugs with a better side effect
profile. Furthermore, many research tools have technological alterna-
tives-the Harvard oncomouse is not the only animal model available
to cancer researchers. °3
Some commentators have argued that aggressive research tool
patenting and licensing could potentially stifle the progress of bio-
medical research by restricting widespread access to key research
tools that enable downstream innovation through the use of exclusive
licensing agreements or through the creation of a patent anticommons
such that a prospective researcher would incur prohibitive search and
licensing costs to assemble the right to use multiple patented tech-
nologies required for the discovery and development of new therapeu-
tic products.204 Accordingly, it may be argued that there is a need to
broadly interpret the 271(e)(1) infringement exemption to include
research tools in order to ensure their widespread availability. °5
203 Because of these and other factors, the likelihood that a research tool
patent will become controversial is greatest when the research tool patent claims a
foundational technology in an area of great scientific and public concern, performs a
function that has no viable technological alternative, and exists in a market such that
exclusive licensing or very high royalties (which have the effect of excluding poten-
tial licensees) is a viable business strategy for the patentee.
204 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Inno-
vation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998)
(arguing that a biotechnology anticommons is forming and that it will hinder the
development of downstream research); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation
in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 813, 831-32 (2001) (discussing the frustration of research caused by
upstream patents); Walsh et al., supra note 201, at 285, 293-97; NIH Report, supra
note 10; see also, e.g., John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of
Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449 (1997) (stating that
patents on biological receptors can prevent other researchers from developing a drug
for that receptor); Derzko, supra note 10, at 392-402 (expressing concern that reach-
through royalty licensing of research tools could restrict broad access); Eisenberg,
supra note 2 at 1079-1086 (discussing factors that may lead to licensing breakdowns);
Gitter, supra note 4, at 1662-63; Mueller, supra note 10, at 7-9, 57-58; Eliot Marshall,
Property Claims: A Deluge of Patents Creates Legal Hassles for Research, 288
SCIENCE 255, 255-56 (2000) (describing how patenting transgenic mice has slowed
down the progress of research).
205 Such an approach is probably more viable than an attack on the patentabil-
ity of research tools. Recent developments in patent jurisprudence have firmly estab-
lished that research tools are patentable, despite early difficulties in determining the
proper scope of some biotechnology inventions. See Mueller, supra note 10, at 45-48
(citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) ("holding that live,
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Two objections can be made to this argument. First, even if it can
be said that restricted access to research tools has a detrimental effect
on the invention of downstream pharmaceutical products, the negative
effects of research tool patenting may be outweighed by the positive
benefits created by the incentives to invent, disclose, and commercial-
ize new research tools (which in turn enable further downstream
inventions) provided by the present system of exclusive rights. A sec-
ond objection is that depriving research tools of meaningful patent
protection through an infringement exemption may not be the best
approach to controlling the potential negative effects of research tool
patenting. Determining the optimal patent policy with respect to re-
search tools is a matter of vigorous debate-a full treatment is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, for reasons that will be discussed
later in this Part, a blanket infringement exemption for any uses of
research tool patents that are related to the development of a FDA-
regulated product is not the optimum manner in which to effectuate
the policy of encouraging the discovery of innovative new therapeutic
products.2°
Currently, there is no overwhelming evidence that drug discovery
and development has been or will be stifled by aggressive research
genetically engineered bacterium is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101."
Mueller, supra note 10, at 47 n.236)); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d
1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment of invalidity based on failure of
patent directed to "highly unpredictable" antisense technology to satisfy enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C § 112's first paragraph, where claims at issue were "quite
broad" and extent of experimentation required to practice invention as claimed in all
prokaryotic or eukaryotic cells would be undue in light of examples disclosing suc-
cessful performance of invention with only single prokaryotic cell, E. coli);
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (revers-
ing preliminary injunction and holding invalid for non-enablement patent directed to
method of producing human growth hormone through cleavable fusion expression
that, in Federal Circuit's view, provided only "a direction for further research"); Janice
M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 615 (1998) (characterizing
Federal Circuit's decision in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) as having effectively elevated the written description require-
ment of section 112's first paragraph to a "super enablement" standard and having
improperly applied written description requirement to originally filed claims). But see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As To the Patentability of
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial DNA Sequences, 23
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 19 (1995) (arguing that existing case law does not unambiguously
resolve the issue of whether a commercial market for a research tool is sufficient
evidence to prove patentable utility).
206 At a minimum, such an approach would fail to address the negative effects
of research tool patenting on research and development not related to drg or medical




tool patenting 2°7 such that a deviation from the default congressional
preference for extending patent protection to all inventions is war-
ranted.2°8 One commentator, analogizing the problem of licensing
multiple biological research tools to the production of "car[s] .. .
made using countless patented parts, fasteners, processes, and subsys-
tems," argues that "patents on inputs generally [do not] prevent the
production of outputs" in "a host of industries," even where
production of a single output, such as a drug, requires bundling
licenses covering multiple inputs such as research tools.2° 9 If other
industries have successfully adapted to problems associated with
licensing multiple inputs, a prudent approach would be to defer radi-
cal changes to the scope of patent protection for research tools unless
there is clear evidence that such problems exist.
Studies that have attempted to determine whether a patent anti-
commons exists with respect to pharmaceutical research tools have
reported mixed results. In a survey conducted by the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), scientists in academia and industry expressed
concern about the transaction costs involved in licensing multiple
proprietary research tools. 210 Another survey by the National Bureau
of Economic Research indicated that researchers and managers within
the pharmaceutical industry are concerned about the possibility that
patents on key biomarkers can exclude competitors from entire thera-
peutic areas. 211 However, an extensive empirical study conducted by
Professors Walsh, Arora, and Cohen suggests that "drug discovery has
207 Mireles, supra note 10, at 145-46; Eric K. Steffe & Timothy J. Shea, Jr.,
Drug Discovery Tools and the Clinical Research Exemption from Patent
Infringement, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW REP. 369, 373-74 (2003).
208 Congress has chosen to pursue a default policy of offering patent protec-
tion to any new and useful invention (of course, other conditions of patentability must
be met). 35 U.S.C. § 101, 102(a) (2007). The Supreme Court has interpreted this to
mean that "anything under the sun that is made by man" can be the subject matter of a
patent. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. No. 1979,
at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)); see also State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
209 F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 720-21 (2001).
210 NIH Report, supra note 10.
211 See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug Devel-
opment Process: Results from a Survey of Industry and the FDA 27-28 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11425, 2005), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl 1425 (discussing industry concerns relating to the patenting
of "biomarkers (quantitative measures of biological effects that provide informative
links between mechanism of action and clinical effectiveness) and .. . surrogate
markers (quantitative measures that can predict effectiveness)").
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not been substantially impeded by [research tool patenting]. 2  One
commentator has suggested that the disparity between the NIH and
Walsh studies may be due to the fact that an anti-commons exists but
that it has not had an effect of drug discovery; that the conditions that
may allow an anti-commons to develop exist but that development has
not yet occurred; or that the industry has learned to reduce transac-
tional costs associated with such research tool licensing in the four-
year period between the NIH and Walsh studies.213 There are also a
number of reasons to predict that, in most cases, research tool patent-
ees will not pursue strategies that unduly restrict access to research
tools. These include the availability of substitute technologies in many
214
research tool markets, actions taken by the NIH and large
pharmaceutical companies to limit the use of restrictive reach-through
licenses,215 the use of nonexclusive licensing as a risk-reduction strat-
216 217egy, academic and institutional norms, the availability of march-
212 Walsh et al., supra note 201, at 285, 293-97. But see PAUL A. DAVID, THE
ECONOMIC LOGIC OF "OPEN SCIENCE" AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN SCIENTIFIC DATA AND INFORMATION: A
PRIMER 13-16 (2003), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-30.pdf
(criticizing the methodology used in the Walsh study); see also Steffe & Shea, supra
note 207, at 374 (noting that the increase in the rate of FDA approvals of new bio-
technology medicines and vaccines over the period from 1990-2000 was greater than
increase the rate of biotechnology patents granted during the same period).
213 Mireles, supra note 10, at 192.
214 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 61-62 (arguing that as long as effective
substitutes are available the patent will not create monopoly power). According to
CHISUM ET AL. "[t]he more substitutes there are for the patented product... the more
horizontal will be the patentee's demand curve, and the closer will be her marginal
revenue curve to her demand, and the smaller will be the dead weight loss she cre-
ates." Id. at 61-62.
215 Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,091 (Dec.
23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines] (stating that reach-through royalty licensing of
NIH-funded inventions is inappropriate); see also Donald R. Ware, Research Tool
Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 292-94 (2002).
216 Ramon A. Klitzke, Patent Licensing: Concerted Action by Licensees, 13
DEL. J. CORP. L. 459, 462 & nn.16-17 (1988) (citing M. COHEN, PATENT LICENSING
305, reprinted in PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND TRADE SECRETS FOR
CORPORATE COUNSEL AND GENERAL PRACTITIONERS (1979) (Practicing Law Institute,
Pamphlet No. 111)).
217 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182-84 (1987) (stating that it is "contrary
to scientific norms to claim exclusive rights in research discoveries") (citing R.
MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 228-53 (1973)); ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA,
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE US PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY DURING THE 1980s,
46-48 (1995) (discussing the effect of internalized scientific values on industry). The
non-exclusive licensing of the Cohen-Boyer patents on gene-splicing technology,
insisted upon by the inventors, scientists at Stanford University, has been advanced as
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in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act,2  and the fact that infringement of
patents on research tools are generally difficult to litigate. 21 9 Further-
more, it has been noted that positive incentives are created by exclu-
sive research tool licensing practices-exclusive licensees have
greater incentives, and in some cases contractual obligations, to ag-
gressively develop products using exclusively licensed tools, and par-
ties that are unable to license tools are forced to expand into new
technological areas.22 °
Not only is it unclear that a research tool anticommons exists or
that restrictive licensing practices are hindering drug discovery such
that a broad infringement exemption is required, but such an approach
would deprive the public of significant benefits that accrue due to the
incentives that patents offer for the invention, disclosure, and com-
mercialization of research tools, as well as the invention of down-
stream technologies that research tools enable. An infringement
exemption that applies to the use of research tools in drug discovery
an example of how scientific norms of openness and communalism have influenced
the broad dissemination of patented research tools. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 77, 93-94 (1999).
218 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 2003) (granting the funding agency the au-
thority to require the assignee or exclusive licensee of a federally funded invention to
grant a march-in license to a third party if the assignee or exclusive licensee has not
taken or is not expected to take steps to achieve practical application of the inven-
tion).
219 See Steffe & Shea, supra note 207, at 374-75 (stating that it may be diffi-
cult to establish (1) infringement involving the undisclosed use of a tool in an internal
drug discovery program, (2) actual damages when the infringer is selling a product
developed through an infringing use of a tool instead of an infringing version of the
tool, and (3) a reasonable royalty rate, which may vary widely based on the nature of
the tool, its market, and the availability of alternatives); R. Innis et al., Positron-
Emission Tomography Tracers as Intellectual Property, 41 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 107S-117S (Supp. 2001) (noting that a drug screening assay could
be used in a foreign country to identify a drug that could then be developed in the
United States without incurring liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), and discussing the
difficult choice of a research tool patentee faces when deciding when to bring an
infringement suit - if a patentee sues at an early stage, a court will be unlikely to
award speculative reach through royalties, but if a patentee chooses to wait until a
drug has been developed his suit may be barred by the six year statute of limitations
under 35 U.S.C. § 286).
220 Adelman, supra note 10, at 1022 (stating that while "biological complexity
offers many opportunities for strategic patenting, potentially enhancing the likelihood
that a patent anticommons will emerge, this characteristic is a double-edged sword: it
also affords many potential routes for engineering around existing patents"); Lee,
supra note 10, at 663 (arguing that strong patent protection for research tools encour-
ages groundbreaking scientific discoveries by forcing basic science researchers to
look beyond existing technologies).
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would deprive many patentees of the primary market for their inven-
tions, thus, undermining the incentives to invent new research tools.
22 1
This loss of incentives would particularly affect private sector firms
that are engaged in the invention of new research tools and would also
have the perverse effect of encouraging research tool patentees to seek
greater remuneration from academic researchers as the pharmaceutical
research market disappeared.
22
If a broad infringement exemption exists, there will be less public
disclosure of research tool technology. Because research tools are not
embodied in the pharmaceutical products that they are used to de-
velop, they cannot be reverse engineered upon the sale of such prod-
ucts.223 Thus, research tools developed for internal use by pharmaceu-
tical firms are more likely to be held as trade secrets in the absence of
meaningful patent protection, reducing the disclosure of research tool
technologies through the publication of enabling patent disclosures
and, thereby, undermining a key policy aim of the patent system.
4
Finally, a broad infringement exemption will, in many cases, dis-
incentivize the commercialization of research tools, a result that will
necessarily have negative effects on the development of downstream
pharmaceutical products that they enable. New research tools are fre-
quently developed by smaller biotechnology firms, many of which are
spun out of or otherwise related to academic laboratories. These firms
depend on venture capital to develop academic inventions into com-
mercial products, and exclusive patent rights are essential to raising
such capital. 225 This was recognized by Congress when it passed the
Bayh-Dole Act, which provides that businesses, universities, and non-
profit organizations can retain title to patents resulting from federally
funded research.226 The exclusive rights thus obtained may be sold or
221 See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 205, at 19.
222 id.
223 See Steffe & Shea, supra note 207, at 374-75.
224 Id.; see also, e.g., NIH Report, supra note 10 (discussing potential risks
and benefits of disclosure of research tool technology by private firms).
225 Brief of Amicus Curiae Vaccinex, Inc. in Support of Respondents at *3,
*9, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237),
2003 U.S. Briefs 1237, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 291 (citing testimony before
the Federal Trade Commission that "patent protection will be critical in encouraging
investment in the next generation of research tools, which might reduce the costs and
time required for the clinical trial phases, which are the most 'expensive part' of the
drug development process"); FTC Report, supra note 187, at ch. 3 p. 20 (2003).
226 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); see also H.R. REP. No. 96-1307,
at 1-2 (1980) (expressing concern that federally funded academic research was not
being sufficiently commercialized and assuming that exclusive licenses to promising
technologies were required to encourage corporations to invest in the additional re-
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licensed to third parties subject to the requirement that they are dili-
gently commercialized.227 Because broadly interpreting 271(e)(1) to
exempt the use of research tools in drug discovery would have the
same effect as revoking patent rights in federally-funded inventions,
such an interpretation would severely undermine the policy goals of
the Bayh-Dole Act.
A broad infringement exemption could also harm small biotech-
nology firms in other ways. Unlike big pharmaceutical firms, which
are able to reinvest profits from the sale of their existing products into
research and development, small biotech start-ups frequently apply
revenue streams from the sale or licensing of their patented research
tool technology to in-house drug-discovery programs. Eliminating that
revenue stream would eliminate some of the drug discovery research
performed by small biotechs. Given the significant number of break-
through drugs discovered by such small firms, this would likely have
a significant negative effect on the overall pace of new drug develop-
ment.228
Denying research tools of meaningful patent protection through
an infringement exemption may not be the best approach to control-
ling the potential negative effects of research tool patenting. As previ-
ously noted, while there are some situations in which research tool
patenting may be said to impede the progress of innovation, there are
many others in which tool patents have a positive or neutral effect.
There is no reason to throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater
through broad judicial interpretation of 271 (e)(1).
A number of proposals have been advanced to address different
facets of the research tool problem that, in large part, preserve patent
incentives for the invention, disclosure, and commercialization of
search, development, and manufacturing capabilities required to bring new products
to market).
227 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000) (granting the right to take title of federally
funded inventions to nonprofit organizations and business firms); 35 U.S.C. §
203(a)(1) (Supp. 2003) (granting the funding agency the authority to require the
assignee or exclusive licensee of a federally funded invention to grant a march-in
license to a third party if the assignee or exclusive licensee has not taken or is not
expected to take steps to achieve practical application of the invention).
221 See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 217, at 61-81 (describing the formation of
networks in pharmaceutical innovation by which the advantages of small biotech
firms in upstream, highly innovative research are leveraged through collaborations
with large pharmaceutical firms that have greater expertise in the clinical develop-
ment phase of drug development); BIANCA PIACHAUD, OUTSOURCING R&D IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: FROM CONCEPTUALIZATION TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
STRATEGIC SOURCING PROCESS, 120 (2004) (stating that "smaller biotechnology firms
focus[] on a small number of selective skills in specialist technologies, which pro-
vide[] them with a significant competitive edge over their much larger rivals").
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research tools. These proposals include: the adoption of an experimen-
tal use exemption, 229 an experimental use exemption combined with a
liability rule in which the research tool patent infringer would pay the
research tool patentee a reach-through royalty,23° compulsory licens-
ing of research tools, 231 the use of patent pools, 232 research tool patent
scope reduction,233 and new commerce department regulations on the
licensing of federally funded research tool inventions.234 Although
these proposals attack different perceived problems related to research
tool patenting, collectively, they show that a narrowly tailored ap-
proach can mitigate such problems, while having limited effects on
229 Proponents of a reinvigorated experimental use exemption have distin-
guished between experimenting on a research tool in order to better understand how it
operates and experimenting with a research tool to develop an unrelated invention.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1078; Mueller, supra note 4, at 975-77; Strandburg, supra
note 4, at 121. Such commentators argue that any experimental use exemption should
not exempt experimenting with activities because experimenting with a research tool
supplants the primary market for research tool invention, and, therefore, dis-
incentivizes the invention of research tools. Mueller, supra note 4, at 975-77. How-
ever, experimenting on activities are appropriate for exemption because they facilitate
the disclosure function of the patent system, particularly in the case of non-disclosing
inventions, and such activities do not form an important commercial market for re-
search tools. Strandburg, supra note 4, at 118-21. This analysis is also relevant to the
use of drug inventions for the purpose of studying mechanisms of drug action and the
use of drug inventions as positive controls. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying
text.
230 Mueller, supra note 10, at 54-66.
231 See Gitter, supra note 4, at 1678-90 (proposing a combination of compul-
sory licensing scheme and a statutory experimental use exemption as a solution to
problems in relation to the patenting of human DNA sequences); see also, e.g.,
Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 880-92
(2003) (studying the R&D investments of six pharmaceutical firms that were forced
to license their inventions under FTC consent decrees); Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe
Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech
Tools?, 53 BuFF. L. REv. 351, 408-11 (2006); Rai, supra note 204, at 843 ("[T]he
only situation where a patent owner can plausibly be forced into compulsory licensing
is if it accumulates enough narrow patents to confer monopoly power in a relevant
market.").
232 Mireles, supra note 10, at 216-25.
233 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 45-46 (arguing that broadening public
acceptance of non-consensual use of patented research tools may reflect a more fun-
damental problem of the issuance of unjustifiably broad biotechnology patents).
234 Kimberlee A. Stafford, Reach-Through Royalties in Biomedical Research
Tool Patent Licensing: Implications of NIH Guidelines on Small Biotechnology
Firms, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 699, 716-17 (2005) (arguing that the Commerce
Department should issue regulations that allow small businesses, but not universities
and non-profits, to use reach-through royalties in the licensing of federally funded
inventions); see also NIH Guidelines, supra note 215, at 72,091 (stating that reach-
through royalty licensing of NIH-funded inventions is inappropriate).
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harmless or beneficial aspects of research tool patenting, and that a
broad interpretation of 271(e)(1) as applied to research tools is the
wrong tool for the job.
To the extent that 271(e)(1) threatens to reduce the economic
value of early-stage or research tool patents, it is the result of judicial
resolution of ambiguous statutory language, not an informed policy
choice made by Congress. Principles of judicial restraint and institu-
tional competence counsel that the balancing of competing policy
considerations (such as balancing the interests of research tool patent-
ees and the social utility of allowing scientific researchers free access
to such research tools) is best undertaken by Congress.23 5
D. Experimenting on the Invention-Study of Undisclosed
Information Pertaining to Patented Drugs or Drug Candidates-
Structure-Activity Relationships and X-Ray Crystal Structures of
Bound Drug-Receptor Complexes
In addition to bioequivalence testing, 271(e)(1) can also remedy
market failures resulting in delays in the public availability of com-
petitive new drugs by acting as a mechanism to supplement the dis-
closure function of the patent system.
An enabling disclosure is part of the fundamental quid pro quo of
236the patent system. However, the statutory disclosure requirements
are minimal, and some have questioned whether the required disclo-
sure conveys enough information to be useful to the public.237 A pat-
ent claiming a new chemical entity having utility as a drug need only
disclose the chemical structure of the drug, disclose at least one way
to make the drug, disclose at least one way to administer the drug, and
show that it is capable of inducing a pharmacologically useful re-
23sponse. 38 Although this information undoubtedly increases the store-
235 See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 465, 505-06 (1988) (arguing that legislatures are better equipped than courts to
deal with the sorts of questions that can be answered only by preference, political
compromise, or majority rule (citing Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process
(tentative ed. 1958) (unpublished manuscript)); Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions
Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
366, 371 (1984).
236 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 247 (1832) (stating that "[t]his [enabling
disclosure] is necessary in order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire, the
advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power to
issue a patent").
7 See Eisenberg, supra note 2 at 1029 n.52.
231 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ('The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it.");
Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that in vitro testing of
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house of public knowledge, a vast amount of information about such
an invention remains undisclosed. While some of this information
may be known to the pioneer pharmaceutical firm and held as a trade
secret, other information may remain undiscovered because the pio-
neer firm has no need for it or because they lack the technological
capacity to develop and use it. Two examples of such information that
are highly useful to pharmaceutical discovery researchers are SAR
(Structure-Activity Relationship) data and X-ray crystal structures of
drug-receptor complexes.
SAR data is a set of information about the biological activities of
similar, but distinctly different, molecules. It is developed by synthe-
sizing structurally analogous molecules and screening them in one or
more assays that give a quantitative measure of biological activity.
Operating under the assumption that similar molecules have similar
activities and that structure-activity trends can be extrapolated from a
finite set of data, medicinal chemists propose hypotheses that guide
the synthesis of further structural analogs. 239 Through an iterative
process, new analogs are synthesized and molecular structures are
optimized to give the desired pharmacological, pharmacodynamic,
and safety properties. 240 This iterative process is the foundation of
rational drug design, which is a dominant methodological approach to
the development of small-molecule drugs.241
SAR data has a close relationship to pharmaceutical patenting.
Typically, most if not all of the biologically active molecules synthe-
sized and screened to give the SAR data set are included as working
examples in the specification of a patent claiming a chemical genus of
a compound t.hat is structurally similar to compounds that have undergone in vivo
testing satisfies the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101); In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d
948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding that in vivo tests were adequate proof of pharma-
ceutical utility).
239 See George A. Patani & Edmond J. LaVoie, Bioisosterism: A Rational
Approach in Drug Design, 96 CHEMICAL REVIEWS 3147, 3148 (1996).
240 See, e.g., Eddy W. Yue et al., Synthesis and Evaluation of Indenopyrazoles
as Cyclin-Dependent Kinase Inhibitors. 3. Structure Activity Relationships at C3, 45
J. MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 5233, 5234-38 (2002) (detailing the process by which a
substituent group on a molecule was optimized for potency against a cell-based
assay).
241 See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 217, at 23-39 (describing the historical rise
and some of the techniques of rational drug design); see also, e.g., Romualdo Benigni,
Structure-Activity Relationship Studies of Chemical Mutagens and Carcinogens:
Mechanistic Investigations and Prediction Approaches, 105 CHEMICAL REVS. 1767
(2005) (discussing the application of a quantitative structure-activity (QSAR) rela-
tionship model for predicting carcinogenicity in several classes of molecules); Patani




pharmacologically active molecules. This is because the test for
whether a genus claim is enabled weighs the presence or absence of
working examples against the breadth of the claim. 242 Thus, the
greater number of examples presented, the broader the potential claim
or the more likely the claim will be held valid against an enablement
challenge. However, despite the fact that a large number of the mo-
lecular structures in a SAR set may be disclosed in a patent, patentees
usually disclose minimal information about biological activity-
commonly expressing biological activities in one assay, when several
may have been run; expressing biological activities as falling within a
set of ranges, with the ranges calculated to be of little use to anyone
reading the patent for the purpose of extracting SAR information; and
not disclosing pharmacodynanic and safety-related data.
SAR data can be very useful to follow-on inventors. This, of
course, is the reason patentees prefer not to disclose it to their com-
petitors. Structural features and activity trends can be used to make
predictions in related but patentably distinct series of molecules. Even
though the full set of SAR data may not be disclosed in a patent, a
competitor, relying on the 271(e)(1) exemption, can reconstitute the
SAR set by re-synthesizing the relevant working examples using the
procedures disclosed in the patent and testing these molecules
in-house according to their own internal screening protocols.24 3
Another technique used by medicinal chemists to design new drug
candidates is structure-based design. Structure-based design is based
on the assumption that knowledge of the physical structure of a drug
binding domain on a target bio-molecule such as an enzyme or recep-
tor can be used to predict new molecular structures that will bind to
and interact with the target.244 Due to the complex nature of drug-
target binding, such work is usually performed by running computer
242 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether a disclosure [is enabling] ... include (1) the quantity
of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3)
the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the
state -of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.").
243 1 have personally participated in re-synthesis and screening activities of
this kind as part of an effort to design-around a competitor's patent claims.
244 See, e.g., Michal Vieth & David J. Cummins, DoMCoSAR: A Novel
Approach for Establishing the Docking Mode that is Consistent with the Structure-
Activity Relationship. Application to HIV-i Protease Inhibitors and VEGF Receptor
Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitors, 43 J. MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 3020, 3020 (2000); Yue et
al., supra note 240, at 5234-38 (2002) (analyzing the results of an SAR study in light
of the structure of a drug-enzyme complex obtained through X-ray crystallography).
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simulations of the relevant interactions. 245 This requires that the struc-
ture of the target as a whole and the location of the binding domain be
known.
The three-dimensional structure of the target is usually deter-
mined by an X-ray diffraction experiment carried out on a crystallized
sample of the target.246 Because the determination of the target's
structure often follows from a discovery by academic researchers that
the target can be manipulated to produce a therapeutic effect, target
structures, when known, are often freely disseminated in the scientific
literature.
Determining the location of a drug-binding domain on the target
requires that a drug be developed that binds to the target and produces
the desired pharmacological effect.247 Then, a complex consisting of
the drug bound to the target can be crystallized and its structure can be
determined by an X-ray diffraction experiment. 248 However, because
there can be multiple binding domains on a given target, because
drugs can bind to the target in different ways, and because the interac-
tion between the drug and the target can cause the three-dimensional
structure of the target (particularly the binding domain) to change, the
usefulness of drug-target complex structures can vary. 249 Because of
this variation, it is useful for computational chemists to know the
structure of multiple drug-target complexes, particularly when one or
more of the complexes includes a drug that is known to be efficacious.
Drugs that are known to be highly efficacious against a target are fre-
quently patented and under preclinical or clinical development. The
owners of patents claiming these drugs are unlikely to grant a license
to a competitor to make the drug and use it to determine the structure
of the drug-target complex, which they will then use to develop a
competing drug. However, under 271 (e)(1), a follow-on inventor can
do precisely that.
Interpreting 271 (e)(1) to exempt competitor experimentation on
pharmaceutical drugs for the purpose of gleaning information about
the invention beyond that required for patentability can be justified on
similar grounds as bioequivalence testing. In the case of bioequiva-
245 See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 217, at 36-39; see also, e.g., Jung-Hsin Lin
et al., Computational Drug Design Accommodating Receptor Flexibility: The Relaxed
Complex Scheme, 124 J. AM. CHEMICAL Soc'Y 5632 (2002); Vieth & Cummins,
supra note 244, at 3020.
246 See Vieth & Cummins, supra note 244, at 3020.
247 Id.
248 id.




lence testing, the patentee loses commercially valuable patent rights
(the de facto patent term extension arising from the right to exclude
generic bioequivalence testing) and gains statutory patent term exten-
sion under section 156. This exchange benefits the public by increas-
ing price competition from generics as soon as possible after patent
expiration. Likewise, the patentee whose invention is experimented on
to disclose information such as SAR data or X-ray crystal structures
of drug-receptor complexes loses commercially valuable trade secrets
in such information and gains statutory patent term extension under
section 156. This exchange has the benefit of furthering public access
to technical information relating to patented inventions and competi-
tion in new drugs directed at the same target. °
It may be suggested that increased disclosure of technical infor-
mation relating to pharmaceutical inventions would be better facili-
tated by increasing the level of disclosure required for patentability.
Such a proposal has the merit of preventing duplicative research by
ensuring that a larger proportion of the technical information devel-
oped for internal use by pharmaceutical companies would be pub-
lished.
However, increasing the disclosure required for patentability as an
alternative for allowing experimentation on pharmaceutical inventions
under 271(e)(1) has a number of drawbacks. First, a separate disclo-
sure requirement for pharmaceutical inventions would undermine the
principle that the patent laws be technologically neutral. Second, it
would place new burdens on the patentee that would have to be met in
order to avoid challenges to patent validity in litigation. For example,
if pharmaceutical patentees are required to disclose SAR data, what if
their data was incorrect? Would they have to use standardized assays?
Who would determine the standard? How would the data have to be
reported? In the case of X-ray structures of drug-receptor complexes,
at present, many drug discovery groups do not have structure-based
design capability. What would they do if required to disclose crystal
structures? What if the receptor is not known, or cannot be crystal-
lized? 25' A diligence standard may alleviate some of these issues, but
satisfaction of a diligence requirement seems a rather indeterminate
basis to determine patentability. The advantage of the current standard
for determining if a disclosure is enabling is that it is roughly equal to
the minimum amount of knowledge about the invention-how to
250 See also infra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.
251 See Finton Sirockin et al., Structure Activity Relationship by NMR and by
Computer: A Comparative Study, 124 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOc'Y 11073, 11073-74




make and use it--that a patentee must possess in order to commer-
cially exploit it. Such a close correlation between the purpose of the
patent system in ensuring commercialization of new technologies and
the requirements of patentability should not be hastily abandoned. 2
Third, and finally, a heightened disclosure standard for patentability,
in the absence of a post-patenting right for competitors to experiment
on the invention, would foreclose the possibility that technologies not
available to the patentee--either because they are invented subsequent
to patent issuance, are subject to restricted licensing terms, or are too
expensive--could be used to glean additional information about the
patented invention.
Another possible criticism of exempting experimentation on
pharmaceutical drugs to disclose information not present in the patent
specification from infringement under 271(e)(1) is that such an ex-
emption is too narrow and should be broadened to include experimen-
tation on other types of inventions. Indeed, similar questions relating
to the appropriate level of disclosure have arisen with respect to
software patents,253 and some commentators who have proposed a
reinvigorated common law research exemption have grounded their
arguments in a general, technologically-neutral, need to further the
disclosure function of patent law by allowing experimentation on (as
opposed to experimenting with, for example, a research tool) patented
inventions. 254 These arguments have merit-perhaps there should be a
general right to experiment on patented inventions. However, to a
greater extent than in the case of a mechanical, electrical, or business
method invention, a disclosure that tells a skilled artisan how to make
and use a pharmaceutical invention will not necessarily disclose how
it actually works. Also, because of the lengthy and costly FDA
approval process, pharmaceutical inventions take an extraordinarily
long time to reach the market, where experimentation on an invention
may occur under an implied license. 5 Thus, pharmaceutical inven-
tions present at least a heightened case for an experimenting-on
infringement exemption.
252 See supra note 2 (discussing the incentive to commercialize theory of
patent law).253 See, e.g., Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Indus-
try: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 75, 131-133 (2002); Kenneth Canfield, The Disclosure of Source Code in
Software Patents: Should Software Patents be Open Source?, 7 COLUM. SCi. & TECH.
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006) (arguing that software patentees should be forced to disclose
source code).
254 See supra note 229.
255 See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03(2)(a) (2006)
(discussing the first sale doctrine).
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E. Use of Patented Drugs as Positive Controls
Positive controls, in the context of pharmaceutical testing, are
drugs whose biological activity is both strong and well-
characterized.256 By testing positive controls, it is possible to verify
that an experiment is functioning as expected. Thus, positive controls
allow pharmaceutical researchers to validate unfamiliar assays more
rapidly, with greater confidence, and with greater ability to trouble-
shoot them than would be possible in their absence. This enables firms
to be more agile and competitive. Also, because drugs used as positive
controls are often chosen because they are known to be efficacious,
they can be used to evaluate the predictive value of different assays
and to develop new assays for use in development of a drug for a par-
ticular indication. Therefore, the availability of positive controls may
increase the ability of researchers to design around or select alterna-
tives to research tools for which licenses are not available.
Positive controls also provide a reference standard by which ex-
perimental data from multiple experiments may be standardized and
compared to published data from other sources. 57 Although data of
the same quality may be obtained without the use of a reference stan-
dard, the number of data points required to achieve the same degree of
certainty in the measurement is substantially higher.258 This demand
for more data points requires that the experimenter perform an
increased number of independent experiments at an increased cost.
Advocating that 271(e)(1) exempt the use of patented pharmaceu-
tical inventions as positive controls from infringement may appear
inconsistent with the argument that the use of research tools should be
not exempted. While it is true that a positive control could be fairly
characterized as a research tool,259 there are several reasons why the
256 See CHOW & SHAO, supra note 195, at 198-99 (discussing the selection of
different types of controls).
257 H.P. RANG ET AL., PHARMACOLOGY 82 (5th ed., 2003).
258 See CHOW & SHAO, supra note 195, at 213-27 (2002) (discussing assess-
ment of drug efficacy in positive control trials).
259 This dichotomy can be seen in the facts of Merck. The RGD peptides were
the subject of research by Dr. Cheresh, eventually to be sold as a pharmaceutical end
product after FDA approval was obtained. However, the RGD peptides were also
used by Dr. Nicolaou, another Scripps scientist, in a program to design and synthesize
non-peptide integrin agonists. Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants at
*6, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 2005
WL 3609039 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2005) (Nos. 02-1052, 02-1065). In that program, the
RGD peptides themselves were not the subject of research but were used as positive
controls (i.e., a research tool used to measure the efficacy of the non-peptide integrin
agonists being developed against a standard benchmark). Id. See also supra note 229
(discussing the difference between experimenting on and experimenting with a pat-
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arguments against exempting research tool use from infringement do
not apply to the use of patented drugs as positive controls. First, the
primary commercial incentive to invent and disclose a new drug is
almost always the potential that such a drug will receive FDA market-
ing approval and be sold as a drug, not licensed as a research tool.260
Thus, it is not clear that taking away the right to exclude others from
using patented drugs as positive controls will result in a reduction in
inventive activity. Second, in many cases, potential revenues from
drug sales are so much larger than potential positive control research
tool revenues that the patentee will refuse to license to its competi-
tors-every day that competitors are delayed from launching a com-
peting drug could potentially mean massive profits. Third, there are
regulatory and liability reasons to avoid licensing pharmaceutical in-
ventions that are not applicable to research tools. 261 Fourth, even if a
research tool is used exclusively by the patentee or an exclusive licen-
see, at least one party is using it as such and some benefit is likely to
accrue to the public through the development of downstream products
that the research tool enables. However, a drug is much less useful to
its original inventor as a positive control than it is to competitors de-
veloping follow-on drugs. Therefore, if a drug patentee refuses to
license their drug for use as a positive control, the benefit to the public
accruing from competitor use is lost. Fifth, and finally, there is a
strong public policy rationale for allowing a specific type of compara-
tive testing (which is in some ways analogous to the use of patented
drugs as positive controls) of pharmaceuticals in preclinical develop-
ment, which is discussed below.
F. Use of Patented Drugs in Comparative Testing
As is the case in bioequivalence testing in the ANDA context,
comparative experimentation between a pioneer drug manufacturer
and a follow-on competitor is relevant in the preclinical setting. While
the sole purpose of the IND application process, the regulatory mile-
stone that marks the culmination of preclinical drug development, is
to allow the FDA to determine whether it is reasonable to proceed
with human trials of the drug candidate,262 a host of other issues must
ented research tool).
260 It should be noted that there are biotechnology firms that develop and
market tool compounds specifically for the purpose of being used as positive controls.
This discussion is not relevant to such tool compounds, and it is not suggested that
their infringement be exempted under § 271(e)(1).
261 NIH Report, supra note 10 (discussing potential risks and benefits of dis-
closure of research tool technology by private firms).
262 See Food & Drug Admin., 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a) (2005) (stating that the
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be addressed before a business decision to commit to clinical devel-
opment can be made. These include the risk that the drug candidate
will fail to meet safety or efficacy goals in clinical trials, the risk that
the FDA will not approve the drug candidate, the potential market for
the drug candidate, and the competitive position of the drug candidate
with respect to alternative drugs that have been approved or that are
undergoing clinical trials and may be approved in the future.
263
Such business decisions are critically important to pharmaceutical
companies, which must allocate limited resources in search of a drug
that will produce economic returns. Clinical trials are extremely ex-
pensive and time-consuming, with phase one costing an average of
thirty million dollars and taking an average of twenty-two months,
phase two costing an average of forty-two million dollars and taking
an average of twenty-six months, and phase three an average of one
hundred and nineteen million dollars and taking an average of thirty
months.264 Thus, any information that supports a decision to undertake
clinical trials of a new drug candidate, to temporarily forgo clinical
trials and continue development in the hope of producing a better drug
candidate, or to abandon a particular project is tremendously valuable.
Several types of information that are relevant to the decision
whether to proceed with clinical trials can be developed through ex-
periments that compare a drug candidate with competitor drugs or
drug candidates, particularly when the competitor drug has undergone
clinical trials. For example, comparative experimentation can help a
drug manufacturer predict whether a drug candidate will meet safety
or efficacy goals in clinical trials and, therefore, be approved by the
FDA.
The FDA's decision to approve a new drug for clinical testing or
marketing is based on the level of risk posed by administration of the
drug to the treatment population, balanced against the likely benefits
of treatment.265 Although the exact level of risk that will be tolerated
by the FDA for a given benefit is impossible to predict, history may
be a useful guide. If the FDA has already approved a drug application
for a particular medical indication, another IND for the same indica-
FDA's primary objective in reviewing an IND is to ensure the safety and rights of the
human test subjects).
263 See STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY
28-34 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the initial decision to proceed with R&D on a new
drug).
264 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 165 (2003) (analyzing data from 1983
through 2000).
265 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000) (listing grounds for rejecting a NDA).
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tion should be more likely to be approved if the second-comer could
show that their drug candidate had an improved efficacy or safety
profile in preclinical testing. If the pioneer has published the results of
its preclinical testing, then the second-comer may be able to compare
its drug candidate without infringing the pioneer's patent. However,
the relevant information may be not be publicly disclosed, the second-
comer may find it useful to subject the two drugs to additional ex-
periments not carried out by the pioneer, or the testing procedure may
be made more accurate by using the pioneer drug as a positive control.
Thus, to obtain the maximum benefit from comparative experimenta-
tion, the second filer must be able to infringe the pioneer's patent
under 271 (e)(1).
Similar considerations also apply to experiments that determine
the mechanism of action of a drug for which an IND is sought. If a
pioneer drug candidate for a particular indication was unsuccessful in
clinical trials due to unacceptable side effects, a second-comer should
be able to confirm, and demonstrate to the FDA, that its drug operates
by a different mechanism of action, thus reducing any inference that
the unacceptable side effects observed in the first set of clinical trials
is likely to recur. The second-comer may need to infringe the pio-
neer's patent under 271 (e)(1) to determine the mechanism of action of
the pioneer drug, which may be poorly characterized or misunder-
stood, or to improve the quality of their testing through use of the
pioneer drug as a positive control.
Comparative experimentation has the potential to improve the
quality of IND submissions received by the FDA because drug devel-
opers will have better information about how their drug compares to
their competitors. Drug development is an open-ended process in
which competitors must weigh the potential benefits of an earlier
market entry against the possibility that further development efforts
will lead to a better drug that will be preferred by doctors and patients,
thus commanding greater market share.266 In the event that its drug
candidates are less efficacious or safe than those drugs that are already
on the market or are at a more advanced stage of development, the
drug developer may have a greater incentive to delay any IND filing
until it has a candidate for clinical testing that compares more favora-
bly with its likely competitors.
266 See CBO REPORT, supra note 39, at ch. 3 p. 21 (discussing the effect of
improved side effect or efficacy profiles on the competitiveness of drugs in crowded
therapeutic classes). Alternatively, if the drug under development was the first to treat
a particular indication, poorer side effect and efficacy profiles may be tolerated.
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In addition to improving the quality of FDA submissions, com-
parative experimentation has the potential to aid efficient allocation of
the resources of drug developers between pursuit of breakthrough
drugs that address unmet medical needs and so-called me-too drugs.267
A breakthrough drug is the first drug to use a particular therapeu-
tic mechanism. 268 Because there are no closely related substitutes for
breakthrough drugs when they are first approved, they often have a
short (typically one to six years) period of pure market exclusivity
before a functionally similar drug, referred to as a "me-too" drug,
reaches the market.269 One result of this period of pure market exclu-
sivity is that demand for the breakthrough drug is relatively insensi-
tive to price and the potential exists for the breakthrough innovator to
earn a relatively high return on R&D investment.270 Development of a
breakthrough drug also confers a substantial benefit on the public by
addressing previously unmet medical need for the first time. However,
the increased incentives and public benefits of developing a break-
through drug are counterbalanced by an increased risk of failure-a
breakthrough innovator does not know that the therapeutic mechanism
that it is targeting will yield a safe and efficacious drug.
A lower-risk strategy for drug discovery firms is to develop me-
too drugs, which act through an identical mechanism as a break-
through drug to treat the same medical indication 1.27 The introduction
of me-too drugs leads to competition in brand name drugs resulting in
lower pricing of both the breakthrough and me-too drugs, although the
breakthrough drug often retains an advantage because it is the most
widely known treatment.272 However, the market for brand name
drugs treating a given indication may rapidly reach a saturation point
at which entry of additional me-too drugs does not result in apprecia-
267 David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars - Drug Promotion in a
Competitive Marketplace, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1350 (1994) (describing "me-
too" drugs as drugs that are similar to brand-name drugs already on the market); CBO
REPORT, supra note 39, at ch. 3 p. 18 (defining "me-too" drugs as new chemical enti-
ties that use the same basic mechanism to treat a disease).
268 CBO REPORT, supra note 39, at ch. 3 p. 18.
269 Id.
270 Id. at ch. 3 pp. 19-20.
271 Kessler et al., supra note 267, at 1350 (stating that an incentive exists for
the development of a "me-too" drug even when it offers no advantages over existing
therapies).
272 See CBO REPORT, supra note 39 at ch. 3 p. 21. But see SCHWErrZER, supra
note 263, at 105-06, 142 (arguing that, in some cases, differentiation among side
effects, convenience, and efficacy can actually lead to higher prices of both the break-
through and me-too drug as the average "fit" between consumer preferences and drug
attributes rises for both drugs).
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273ble price decreases for the consumer. Once such a saturation point
is reached, it has been shown that me-too drugs are unlikely to be
commercially successful for their developers, unless they are signifi-
cantly safer, more efficacious, or less likely to cause side effecs. 274 In
addition to leading to undesirably low returns on R&D investment for
pharmaceutical firms, over-saturation of a therapeutic area with
me-too drugs also harms the public because resources that are
expended to develop unnecessary me-too drugs could have instead
been allocated to the development of breakthrough drugs addressing
unmet medical needs.
Comparative experimentation on competitors' drugs, carried out
early in the development process, may increase the ability of pharma-
ceutical firms to predict whether their me-too drugs will be commer-
cially viable, leading to a more efficient allocation of R&D resources
between breakthrough and follow-on pharmaceutical innovation. This
will increase the rate of development of drugs that address unmet
medical needs at the expense of the development of me-too drugs
having no advantages in safety or efficacy in saturated therapeutic
markets. Because it promotes brand name versus brand name competi-
tion, which is an extension of the original purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act-to promote generic versus brand name competition-
such comparative experimentation should be permitted under
271(e)(1).
V. UNLICENSED CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INFRINGING DRUGS
One activity that does not appear to have much precedent in
pharmaceutical firm practice is the unlicensed clinical development of
a drug that is known to infringe another firm's patent. The early avail-
ability of exclusive rights to intellectual property is recognized as
being critically necessary to the investment of substantial resources
into the development of new technologies.275 This is particularly true
in the case of pharmaceutical inventions where product development
and regulatory approval is extremely time-consuming and costly.
276
Thus, extremely powerful incentives exist for pharmaceutical firms to
resolve intellectual property disputes before investing heavily in clini-
273 CBOREPORT, supra note 39 at ch. 3 p. 21.
274 See id.
275 See supra note 2 (discussing the incentive to commercialize theory of
patents).
276 DiMasi et al., supra note 264, at 166 (stating that the average development
cost per approved drug was $802 million for the period between 1983 and 2000).
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cal development. However, an expansive interpretation of 271(e)(1)
has the potential to alter the balance of patent incentives that militate
against unlicensed clinical development. The facts surrounding the
Merck case prove this point. Despite the fact that Merck's RGD pep-
tides and Cheresh's monoclonal antibody literally infringe Integra's
patents, the National Cancer Institute and Ixsys filed IND applications
seeking to pursue clinical development.277 Such a change in the patent
incentives affecting the development of clinical candidates may cause
several undesirable consequences: a reduction of the value of patents
claiming such clinical candidates, a reduction in the incentive to
commercialize new drugs offered by the patent system, and an
increased potential for highly contentious post-approval licensing
negotiations.
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of 271(e)(1) will
reduce the economic value of early stage pharmaceutical patents.
Using the outcome of Merck as an example, Integra was denied the
opportunity to recover infringement damages in the amount of
$6,375,000, which the district court ultimately determined to be a
reasonable royalty given Scripps's and Merck's use of the RGD pep-
tides.278 Not only was Integra denied a reasonable royalty from past
infringing uses of their inventions, but future infringers who are en-
gaged in preclinical drug research activities, bargaining in the shadow
of the legal rule expressed in Merck, are unlikely to negotiate a license
to practice Integra's RGD patents, or, if they do, they will offer a
reduced royalty rate. Furthermore, start-up companies like Telios
depend on early stage pharmaceutical patents to raise money from
venture capitalists necessary to complete the commercialization of
their technology and ultimately obtain FDA approval for their prod-
ucts. Post-Merck, such fundraising will be more difficult, possibly
leading to reduced investment in development and commercialization
of early-stage pharmaceutical inventions.
The Merck decision will also have similar effects on future early-
stage pharmaceutical inventions. For inventions made by academic
researchers and disseminated though publication in scientific journals
(thus eliminating the possibility of protecting the invention as a trade
secret), no one will have exclusive rights to engage in activities re-
lated to preclinical drug development. This lack of exclusive rights
will cause the same failure of incentives to heavily invest in research
and development of new technologies that led to the enactment of the
277 See supra notes 136-37.
278 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-B(AJB), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, at *38 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
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Bayh-Dole Act and underpin the Patent Act as a whole.279 In the case
of inventions made in the course of commercial research, it is likely
that the invention will be held as a trade secret, which would have the
effect of discouraging early dissemination of technical information
and complicating the ability of the inventing company to enter into
economically efficient licensing agreements or to secure outside
financing.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's Merck opinion fails to antici-
pate a likely outcome of its holding, which is that the successful
development of FDA-approved drugs that infringe early-stage phar-
maceutical patents will occur in the absence of a pre-existing licensing
agreement. Because only a small fraction of clinical drug candidates
lead to FDA approved drugs and because the FDA approval timeline
is so long, it is likely that some pharmaceutical research companies
will, like Merck, choose to conserve their financial resources and will
not enter into a preliminary licensing agreement with the early-stage
pharmaceutical patentee. Since 271(e)(1) exempts only activities
related to FDA approval and not the sale of the FDA approved prod-
uct, a licensing agreement will have to be reached before the drug
embodying the early-stage patent may be sold.
Such a shift in the legal background against which licensing nego-
tiation occurs is likely to have three principle effects. First, licensing
negotiations are more likely to be contentious, with the early-stage
pharmaceutical patentees perhaps feeling that their inventive contribu-
tion has been unjustifiably exploited without their consent. Also, as
clinical data is generated, FDA marketing approval of the drug
becomes more certain, and revenues from sales of the drug can be
predicted accurately, negotiations may devolve into a zero-sum game
in which each party tries to position itself to capture revenues at the
expense of the other party. Second, the holders of patents on early-
stage pharmaceutical inventions that are successfully developed into
FDA-approved products will have greater leverage in licensing nego-
tiations and will be able to negotiate much higher royalty rates than
are currently customary. When licenses are negotiated prior to com-
mencement of preclinical research, license fees are discounted due to
the high risk that research using the licensed invention will not lead to
the successful development of an FDA-approved product.280 Also,
279 See supra notes 2, 226-27 and accompanying text.
280 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297,
300 (2001) (stating that, as of 1999, the average marketing approval rate of new
chemical entities on which an IND had been filed between 1981 and 1992 was almost
twenty percent); see also, Stafford, supra note 234, at 701-02 (2005) (describing the
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because the party that obtains FDA marketing approval and seeks to
license the original patent will have invested heavily in developing
and obtaining approval of the infringing product, it would be in an
extremely poor position to walk away from a licensing deal and
would, therefore, have reduced bargaining power. Third, the flow of
licensing royalties from firms that license and develop early-stage
pharmaceutical inventions into FDA-approve products to inventors of
early-stage pharmaceutical inventions will become less evenly dis-
tributed. The majority of early-stage pharmaceutical inventions that
are currently licensed do not ultimately lead to an FDA-approved
product. 281 If, in the wake of Merck, patents claiming early-stage
pharmaceutical inventions are not licensed, their inventors will re-
ceive nothing, while the successful minority of inventors will be in a
position to negotiate royalty payments far in excess of what they cur-
rently receive. Although the effects of such changes are difficult to
predict, they have the potential to alter the flow of capital back to
early-stage pharmaceutical inventors (which may be used to fund ad-
ditional inventive activity) and incentives to invent and commercialize
early-stage pharmaceutical inventions. For this reason, such changes
should be made by an institution competent to reconcile the compet-
ing interests of early-stage pharmaceutical patentees, the companies
that develop early-stage pharmaceutical inventions into FDA-
approved products, and the public. 282 Because courts are not the best
institutions to balance such interests, an expansive interpretation of
271(e)(1), such as the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Merck,
which has the effect of broadly affecting these competing interests,
should be avoided if possible. Absent legislative revision, the best
course the courts could take is to revive the narrow interpretation of
271(e)(1) advanced by the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly.283 Although
this interpretation would not solve the problem of unlicensed devel-
opment of early-stage pharmaceutical inventions, it would place the
use of research tools outside the scope of 271(e)(1) while permitting
the beneficial infringing activities identified earlier: bioequivalence
testing of pioneer drugs, experimenting on pioneer drugs for the pur-
pose of facilitating disclosure beyond that required for patentability,
use of pioneer drugs as positive controls, and comparative testing of
pioneer drugs. Finally, a revival of the narrow holding of Eli Lilly is
use of reach-through royalties as one such discounting method).281 See DiMasi, supra note 280, at 300 (stating that, as of 1999, the average
marketing approval rate of new chemical entities on which an IND had been filed
between 1981 and 1992 was almost twenty percent).
282 See supra note 235.
283 See supra notes 86-89.
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feasible-the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that statutory
symmetry between sections 271(e)(1) and 156 is not the correct basis
for interpreting what patented inventions may be infringed under
271 (e)(1). 284
VI. SECTION 271(E)(1) OF TITLE 35 SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO NARROW THE INFRINGEMENT
EXEMPTION
An infringement exemption governing the pharmaceutical indus-
try should promote competition in both brand name and generic drugs,
thus leading to lower prices for consumers; should ensure that strong
incentives exist to develop and market breakthrough, follow-on, and
generic drugs, as well as new biomedical research tools, thus provid-
ing new drug therapies and lower-cost or improved versions of exist-
ing therapies; should enable pharmaceutical research and development
resources to be allocated as efficiently as possible; and should provide
a clear legal standard upon which industry participants can rely.
For the reasons discussed above, these aims are best accommo-
dated when bioequivalence testing of pioneer drugs, experimenting on
pioneer drugs for the purpose of facilitating disclosure beyond that
required for patentability, use of pioneer drugs as positive controls,
and comparative testing of pioneer drugs are exempted from
infringement, but where the use of patented research tools and the
unlicensed clinical development of infringing drugs is not.
The goal of such an exemption should not be to radically reorder
the incentive structure and legal rules that underpin the broader law of
patents. Rather, the exemption should narrowly mitigate anti-
competitive incentives that exist in the pharmaceutical industry and
prevent certain types of disclosures or consensual licensing from
occurring.
In crafting such an exemption, it is apparent that the types of
infringing activities that should be exempted all involve the infringe-
ment of a patent on a pharmaceutical invention. Limiting the exemp-
tion to infringement of pharmaceuticals ensures that research tool
patents may not be infringed. The other category of infringement
identified as an undesirable candidate for exemption-unlicensed
clinical development-may be addressed by redrafting 271 (e)(1) such
that it only exempts infringing activity that is reasonably related to the
development of a new drug subject to FDA approval that, as of the
284 But see supra note 174 (noting that the Supreme Court's opinion in Merck
may be read to implicitly adopt the broad holding of Eli Lilly).
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filing of an IND on that new drug, is not infringing or is the subject of
a consensual license. This modification will give follow-on research-
ers some latitude in developing new uses for existing pharmaceutical
inventions and will also channel the parties towards early licensing
negotiations. Finally, 271(e)(1) should be modified so that it is clear
that activities related to the development of a new drug subject to
FDA approval are exempted, as well as activities related to the devel-
opment of information that will be submitted to the FDA. The relevant
portion of 271(e)(1) currently reads:
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention285 . .. solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.286
The following modifications are suggested:
1) Replace the term "patented invention" with "patented drug
product or medical device subject to regulation under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act"-This modification
restricts the scope of the exemption such that only patents
covering drugs and medical devices may be infringed. The
language used is designed to mirror the definition of "prod-
ucts" that are eligible for patent term extension under section
156.87 This language will essentially codify the narrow
holding of Eli Lily, which restricts the application of 271 (e)(1)
to infringement of patents claiming inventions that are eligible
285 The following text has been omitted to focus on the relevant portion of the
statute: "(other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those
terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4,
1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation
techniques)." 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This text relates to the lack of an abbrevi-
ated application process for biotechnology-derived veterinary drugs. See Pub. L. No.
100-670, § 106, 102 Stat. 3971 (1988) ("Notwithstanding section 512(b)(2) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [subsec. (b)(2) of this section], the Secretary
of Health and Human Services may not approve an abbreviated application submitted
under such section for a new animal drug which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques.").
28635 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
287 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(1) (2000).
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for patent term extension under section 156 as envisioned by
the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act.288 Most importantly,
this modification places research tools outside the scope of
the exemption.
2) Omit the term "solely"-This modification reaffirms that
courts should follow a more expansive interpretation of what
"uses" are "reasonably related., 289 This is appropriate given
that the proposed revisions narrow the exemption by restrict-
ing the types of patents that may be infringed and is necessary
to avoid the possibility of a narrow textual interpretation such
as that followed by the court in Scripps Clinic.
290
3) Replace the text "the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufac-
ture, use, or sale of drugs" with "(i) the development of a drug
or medical device occurring prior to the first filing of an
application for the sale or use of said drug or medical device
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or, (ii) the
development and submission of information under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)"-This modification serves several functions. First,
by changing the focus of the first part of the new text to de-
velopment of products rather than development of informa-
tion, it clearly establishes that the exemption is not limited to
activities related to the development of information that will
be submitted to the FDA. This codifies the part of the Su-
preme Court's holding in Merck that granted researchers
greater latitude to experiment on patented inventions during
the discovery and pre-clinical development phases.29' Second,
by limiting the first part of the exemption to uses which occur
prior to the first filing of an application to use or sell the drug
(such as an IND or NDA), unlicensed clinical development of
the type discussed in Section V of this Note will not be per-
mitted. Third, infringing activity related to an ANDA filing
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) is distinguished from other activi-
ties, and the original language of "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information ' 292 is retained.
Thus, the proposed modifications should not affect the appli-
cation of 271 (e)(1) to ANDA-related activities.
288 See supra notes 37-39, 76-90 and accompanying text.
289 See supra Part II.A.
290 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
292 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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Accordingly, a redrafted version of 271(e)(1) would read as
follows:
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented drug product or medical device
subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ... for uses reasonably related to (i) the de-
velopment of a drug or medical device occurring prior to
the first filing of an application for the sale or use of said
drug or medical device under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act or, (ii) the development and submission of
information under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
CONCLUSION
While the proposed changes to 271 (e)(1) do not fully account for
variances in the best manner by which to effect similar policies with
respect to the development and regulation of medical devices as such
an account is beyond the scope of this Note, the proposed version of
271(e)(1) addresses many of the current problematic aspects of the
body of case law interpreting 271(e)(1)-clearly placing research
tools outside the scope of the exemption, eliminating the possibility of
unlicensed clinical development of drugs, and clarifying that
271(e)(1) does in fact apply to preclinical experimentation that may
not end up being submitted to the FDA.
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